Showing posts with label Essay. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Essay. Show all posts

Thursday, June 14, 2012

Why an unperceived harm is not a harm at all.


This is an excerpt from a larger essay I submitted on Organ Donation. Ultimately I argued that organ donation should be mandatory in almost all cases. First, however, I had to deal with some metaphysical arguments that stated that it is possible for one to be harmed after-death. The main defender of this point of view is Pitcher in his essay 'The misfortunes of the dead' (available here).
As always comments and criticism are welcomed.

Why an unperceived harm is not a harm at all:


There is a vast amount of philosophical literature that aims to convince the reader than we can be harmed by something without having knowledge of that something (Pitcher; Feinberg; Hamer and Rivlin). Often such writers will appeal to thought experiments to intuitively demonstrate this point. I believe that these thought experiments function as mere intuition pumps that exploit weaknesses in our use of language. They also encourage readers to adopt a ‘Gods-eye’ perspective that is neither accurate to how our lives are experienced nor useful in increasing the understanding of our lives. Ultimately I propose that the intuitions mobilized through the thought experiments of George Pitcher in his work ‘The misfortunes of the Dead’[1] are irrational and untrustworthy.

Pitcher begins his oft-quoted work with a thought experiment that describes the death of Mrs White. Mrs White, whilst alive, proudly operated a business that she hoped would flourish for a long time. After her death, however, her business collapsed and her employees were all laid off.  Pitcher claims that while it would be bizarre to think that the collapse of the business is a harm to the deceased Mrs White there is an entirely plausible sense in which the ante-mortem Mrs White is harmed retrospectively by the closure of her business after her death (Pitcher). 

It will help here to establish what it is that we mean when we talk about ‘harm’. Perhaps the most obvious examples of harm involve a change in ones metaphysical state for the worse; for example, I might lose my jacket in a snowstorm and go from being comfortably warm to uncomfortably cold. This definition, however, is too restrictive posits Pitcher. His definition of harm is as follows:

An event or state of affairs is a misfortune for someone (or harms someone) when it is contrary to one or more of his more important desires.

In common dialogue this definition of being ‘harmed’ might be somewhat closer to what we think of as being ‘wronged’ – In fact Pitcher uses the term ‘wronged’ in place of ‘harm’ in the beginning of his essay to help the reader become accustomed to his definition of harm. An example used by Pitcher of somebody being ‘wronged’, and thus also harmed (Pitcher goes on to argue that they are the same thing), is as follows:

Bill Brown promises his dying father that he will bury him in the family plot when he dies. Bill instead sells his father’s corpse to a medical school for dissection by students. 

Pitcher claims that:
Our intuition tells us that Mr Brown has been badly betrayed by his son.

It is this intuition that drives Pitcher to the conclusion that such betrayals are ‘harmful’. In choosing to defy his father’s desires Bill Brown has wronged his father and also (if one accepts Pitcher’s definition of harm) harmed Bill Brown, says Pitcher. It is important to note that Pitcher clearly states that it is ante-mortem Bill Brown that is harmed and not the now deceased Bill Brown. To use Pitchers memorable phrase his son’s betrayal casts a ‘Shadow of Misfortune’ back over the life of Bill Brown. A consequence of accepting this view is that harms are essentially ‘timeless’ (Ott). As Feinberg states in his work ‘Harm to Others’:

It does not suddenly ‘become true’ that the ante-mortem [person] was harmed.[2] Rather it becomes apparent to us for the first time that it was true all along – that from the first time [person] invested enough in his cause to make it one of his interests, he was playing a losing game.(Feinberg)

To bring it back to the example of Bill Brown and his son, Bill Brown was harmed by his son’s betrayal as soon as he invested an interest in being buried (and not sold for research). Whilst Bill Brown may not have existed at the time of the betrayal his interests (in not being sold for research) still exist in the sense that they can be blocked or fulfilled (Feinberg). One benefit of this conception is that it both explains our intuitions that the young Mr Brown’s betrayal is harmful whilst avoiding the bizarre conclusion that the now deceased Bill Brown is being harmed. It also escapes any notion of backwards causation because it is not that the betrayal causes the harm, it’s that the betrayal makes true that Bill Brown was harmed all along (whilst he was alive).

I will now argue, in opposition to the Pitcher-Feinberg theory , that our intuitions are inaccurate and need to be modified rather than accepting that argument that ante-mortem people can be harmed by events occurring post-mortem. I will use two of Pitcher’s thought experiments to demonstrate my point. The first one is the story of Bill Brown and his son and is outlined above.

Pitcher would like to argue that the young Mr Brown harms his father by betraying his interests. I disagree that the young Mr Brown ‘betrays’ his father and believe that the use of such a word is misleading. I do not deny there is a certain uneasiness and empathy that we intuitively feel towards Bill Brown’s situation. This uneasiness, however, is a different sort of uneasiness to what one usually experiences when told about an instance of betrayal. Unfortunately, there is no word (that I am aware of) that precisely expresses the feeling that one has when made aware of ‘after-death betrayal’. To call it ‘betrayal’ (even if it is, perhaps, the closest existing word that we have to describe such a feeling) is misleading and implies several false conclusions, including the assumption that regular betrayal (when both parties involved are alive) and after death betrayal are similar and comparable.
In a regular instance of betrayal there are usually two flavours of experience that combine into a singular feeling[3]. These are:

a)      A sense of empathy for the negative experiences that the betrayed might now experience and;
b)      A sense of disgust (or other negative emotion) towards the moral character of the betrayer.

Usually (b) will follow from (a): It is because the betrayed will now have a worse existence than if the betrayal did not occur that the betrayal is a harm. In the case of Bill Brown, however, it is different. It is nonsensical to worry about clause (a) in Bill Browns situation because it is impossible for the deceased Bill Brown to have negative experiences[4]. Nevertheless we still might intuitively feel disgust towards the alleged ‘betrayer’ (the young Mr Brown) due to the likeness of such a scenario to other instances of betrayal. This disgust is, I believe, misplaced. The reason that we feel that the betrayers act is so depraved is because betrayal is usually associated with negative consequences for the betrayed. In Bill Brown’s case, however, there are no negative consequences of his son’s act and it is therefore not a ‘betrayal’ at all. 

I predict that those unconvinced by my definition might cite cases similar to Thomas Nagel’s scenario (Rachels) in which somebody is betrayed by his friends by being ridiculed behind his back but is always treated politely to his face. It is still betrayal, might say the critics of my view, despite the fact that the ridiculed agent might be oblivious to the truth of his ‘friendship’ with these people. To this response I would again rebut that the reasoning behind such a reply is based upon faulty intuitions. Scenarios similar to Nagel’s example above are very common, but they are all beset with the same weakness; that is, they all suffer from the uselessness of the ‘Gods-Eye Perspective’.

The ‘Gods Eye Perspective’ is the default position that we adopt in thought experiments. The realm inside of a thought experiment is drastically different to the world that we live in. When presented with a thought experiment we have full knowledge of all of the factors and can conceive of better and worse situations than the one presented. Rarely, if ever, are we so enlightened in life. When we consider the case of someone – let’s call him Jim – being ridiculed behind his back we can equally easily imagine a scenario in which he is not ridiculed. Thus, intuitively, we think that something bad is occurring in Jim being ridiculed. The reason for such thoughts is because we can imagine a world that is better (a world in which everything is the same but Jim is NOT ridiculed by his friends behind his back) and by comparison the world in which Jim IS ridiculed behind his back seems bad. It is this phenomenon, I believe, that falsely causes us to feel as if Jim is being harmed by the ridicule. 

If we eliminate the God’s Eye Perspective and try and imagine ourselves as actually being Jim we will find it much more difficult to locate any source of harm (provided Jim does not discover that he has been ridiculed). This is because when we step into Jims shoes and ask “Is this scenario bad” we are lacking the God’s Eye Perspective to imagine a better possible existence. Given that Jim’s subjective experiences of reality are pleasant we must concede that his life simply is pleasant. When we look from a God’s Eye Perspective we tend to judge the value of a scenario based on its comparative desirability in reference to other possible worlds. In the absence of such a perspective (i.e. in the ‘real world’) we can only judge how good our situation is based upon our subjective experiences of the world. I propose that we accept the Descartian/Humean ideal that regardless of the extent of our ignorance regarding the external world our perceptions of our internal states will always be true. 

Having demonstrated how the intuitions mobilized by Pitcher’s and Nagel’s thought experiments are untrustworthy I can move towards what I believe is to be a more reasonable conclusion. The conclusion that I would like to propose is that a harm cannot exist unless it can be perceived of. I believe that this conclusion is easy to reach once one understands how our intuitions regarding the harm of unperceived negative actions rest on unstable foundations. 

In a sense I am willing to ‘bite the bullet’ of the reductio ad absurdum argument and accept as a consequence of my argument that we are not harmed by the infidelity of our partners (for example) but by the discovery of such infidelity. I must admit, however strange it seems, that I would not be harmed by a partner that was unfaithful to me if I did not sense any difference whatsoever in their actions. Without the ‘Gods-Eye-Perspective’ of the thought experiment I would have no reason to imagine things being better. If I were to die having never found out about such infidelities I think it would be inaccurate to say that I was ‘harmed’ by my partners’ action. Infidelity is harmful because of the effects that it often has on peoples sense of self worth and the degradation of trust it causes when discovered. If you take away these negative effects (as happens in the case of the ignorant partner) it is much harder to say that the person cheated upon has been harmed. Nonetheless, such a choice to be unfaithful (when there is an expectation of fidelity) reflects very negatively on one’s moral character because to act in such a way is to acknowledge the risks of causing someone considerable suffering yet to continue regardless. Thus being unfaithful in a supposedly monogamous relationship might be considered ‘unvirtuous’ rather than ‘harmful’. 

When applied to the case of after death organ donations it becomes clear that an unconsenting organ donor cannot be harmed by a violation of her ante-mortem interests unless she knows (whilst alive) that her interests were going to be violated after death and suffers stress and anxiety throughout her life as a consequence. Thus, organ donation is not a harm unless it is perceived as harmful by a living agent.

REFERENCES:

Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others. Oxford University Press, 1987. Print.

Hamer, C. L., and M. M. Rivlin. "A Stronger Policy of Organ Retrieval from Cadaveric Donors: Some Ethical Considerations." Journal of Medical Ethics 29.3 (2003): 196-200. Print.

Ott, Walter. "Are There Duties to the Dead?" Philosophy Now March/April 2012: 14 - 16. Print.

Pitcher, George. "The Misfortunes of the Dead." American Philosophical Quarterly 21.2 (1984): 183-88. Print.




[1] And are representative of the sort also found in the works of Feinberg, Hamer, and Rivlin.
[2] When their interests are thwarted.
[3] There are probably more than two feelings involved in the emotional response to ‘betrayal’ however I believe these to be the most vivid.
[4] As Epicurus poignantly writes:
“So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more”  (Epicurus)

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Aristotle and Epicurus.


Here is an essay that I wrote in the Summer Semester. It was very difficult to keep to the word count because I found the topic really interesting.


The Fulfilled Life - Ataraxia and Eudaimonia
By Andrew Bloyce.

Few questions are as poignant and timeless as 'What does living well consist of?' So central is this question to human life that many people will passionately defend one or another conception of the good. Despite this passionate debate, however, modern philosophers have come no closer to a consensus on what defines a good life any more than the great Greek thinkers did several millennia ago.

Two enduring theories of the good come from Aristotle and Epicurus. For Aristotle the best life is the fulfilled life and is found in those who practice virtuous deeds. Aristotle uses the word eudaimonia to describe the fulfilled life. Epicurus's conception of the good life is hedonistic; he supports the idea that pleasure is intrinsically good and that pain is intrinsically bad. For Epicurus the good life consists in a state in which there is an absence of pain in the body and an absence of trouble in the soul.[1]  This state of tranquility and freedom from anxiety Epicurus calls ataraxia. [2]  The purpose of this essay is to conduct a comparative philosophical analysis of both eudaimonia and ataraxia as conceptions of the good life in modern times. The structure of this essay will be to accurately define eudaimonia and ataraxia, discuss the affordances and constraints of both conceptions of the good life and to finally determine which theory (on balance) provides a better conception of the good life for the modern age.

Aristotle reaches his idea that fulfillment comes through virtue by methodologically rejecting the competing conceptions of the good; these being the pursuit of pleasure, fame and money.[3]  Money is quickly dismissed as a candidate for the good because it is desired instrumentally - for what it can purchase. Fame is equally easily dismissed because the fulfillment achieved through being well thought of is rather shallow. What people really want is not just to be well thought of, but to actually be good. Pleasure is given a rather superficial account in Chapters 4-6 in the Nicomachean ethics where it is dismissed as a life only fit for animals. It has been stated before[4] that Aristotle may have had in mind something similar to John Stuart Mill's "lower pleasures" when he argues that experiencing pleasures cannot be what makes life fulfilling.  Aristotle explicitly supports this conjecture when he states:

                Concerning the bodily pleasures, one must examine the arguments to the effect that some          pleasures, such as the beautiful ones, are most certainly worthy of choice, but not the bodily            pleasures with which a dissipated person is concerned.[5]

Aristotle's so-called beautiful pleasures can safely be assumed to be the pleasures that one experiences when fulfilling one's ergon. Ergon translates to 'function' in english and it is the satisfying of one's ergon that leads to fulfillment (and as a byproduct pleasure) according to Aristotle. Aristotle decided that the function of a human must be to fully realize our characteristically human capabilities.[6] Whilst there are many capabilities that uniquely characterize us as human beings the most important of these to Aristotle is our capacity for rational thought (or 'theoria') .

Once one has embraced that their ergon is to foster the development of their reason it follows that through that reason they will also realise that the best courses of action lie in a mean between deficiency and excess.[7] This theory of the mean provides the basic skeleton on which Aristotle's virtue ethics is based, however there is one final attribute that the virtuous person must possess.  To be able to put the theory of the mean into practice one must also possess a certain amount of practical wisdom (phronesis) and have had a satisfactory upbringing. Practical wisdom is described far more cryptically than theoria in the Nichomacean ethics but can be colloquially understood as 'street smarts' or the ability to correctly judge which virtue is appropriate in each situation.

From the writings of Epicurus it is hard to assume that Epicurus had any interest in virtues like courage or justice; he was, however, very interested in moderation and temperance. Epicurus embraced an unusual hedonistic stance that is sometimes referred to as 'negative hedonism'. Negative hedonism (like regular hedonism) promotes pleasure as the only intrinsic good however instead of advocating the pursuit of  this pleasure proponents of negative hedonism argue that we should instead aim at eliminating pain. Once all pain is eliminated one will be in a state of tranquility that Epicurus calls ataraxia. 

Epicurus realised that many of the pains that we experience come from unfulfilled desires. In order to alleviate this type of pain there are two obvious solutions: 1) To attain the object of desire, OR 2) To eliminate the desire itself. Epicurus chose the latter solution and justified his choice by distinguishing between desires that are 'natural and necessary', 'natural and not necessary', and 'neither natural nor necessary'.[8] It is best if one can learn to be satisfied with the fulfilment of only the natural and necessary desires because 'what is good is easy to get'[9] says Epicurus. In practise Epicurus advocates a simple life in of moderation, a life that involves friendship, simple foods, and not much more. 

Both Aristotle and Epicurus agree that the pursuit of money will not bring one any closer to the fulfilled life. They also both agree that fame is not important to achieving fulfilment. These claims, however, run in opposition to the data found in the WDH that shows a correlation between subjective ratings of happiness with social rank and income.[10]  Epicurus would probably rebut the importance of such data by saying that the people who gave themselves lower subjective ratings because of comparative status or income deficiencies only did so because they had unnecessary desires for such things in the first place. Aristotle could probably also recover from this data by pointing out that the virtuous person would likely not be troubled by a lack of fame or wealth, so what the data points out is not a problem with his theory but an excess of virtue-lacking citizens. In fact both Aristotle and Epicurus provide solutions to the stresses one may feel in an life devoid of fame or wealth.
Perhaps a large benefit of Aristotle's ethics is that it focuses on an active life, rather than the arguably passive existence expounded in Epicurus' writings.[11] It is part of Aristotle's moral training that we engage in actions that may not necessarily be at once pleasurable in order to become more rational or virtuous.[12] [13] In contrast Epicurus' conception of fulfillment as ataraxia naturally leads to a life secluded from society whereby unnecessary desires can be more easily avoided.[14] If we return to the empirical facts (a move that Aristotle and Epicurus would probably both approve of) it can be observed that an active life consisting of a variety of activities results in increased health and longevity, sociability, effective conflict resolution skills, original thinking, and altruism.[15] These aforementioned perks can (on my interpretation of the texts) only be secured through the active life that Aristotle describes. Nevertheless there are points of convergence between the two thinkers in regards to the importance of friendship in securing a fulfilled life.

In conclusion both conceptions of the fulfilled life have significant merit, however Aristotle's ethics provides a far more comprehensive framework of how to live than Epicurus.[16] Aristotle teaches us how to live, what to feel and what to do - Epicurus instead focuses on fixing potentially harmful thought patterns. What Epicurus' theory lacks in breadth, however, it compensates for in its accessibility[17] and  it's poignant and relevant advice for dealing with hardships.  If there is a time in one's life to ponder Epicurus it is when one is suffering from the symptoms of our postmodern age. Anxiety about wealth, status and possessions can be alleviated through a perusal of Epicurus' writings and this achievement cannot be overstated.  

 WORKS CITED:

Aristotle, and Joe Sachs. Nicomachean Ethics. Newbury, MA: Focus Pub./R. Pullins, 2002. Print.

Bergsma, Ad, Germaine Poot, and Aart C. Liefbroer. "Happiness in the Garden of Epicurus." Journal of Happiness Studies 9.3 (2008):  Print.

Boylan, Michael. "Aristotle: Biology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 02 Oct. 2004. Web. 24 Jan. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-bio/>.

Epicurus. "Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus." The Information Philosopher - Dedicated to the New Information Philosophy. Web. 24 Jan. 2012. <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/epicurus/letter_to_menoeceus.html>.
 
Hughes, Gerard J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge, 2001. 72. Print.

Russell, Bertrand. "The Epicureans." A History of Western Philosophy. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972. 244-45. Print.

Striker, Gisela. "Ataraxia: Happiness as tranquillity" Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge. England: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print. 

Veenhoven, R. (2006). World Database of Happiness: Continuous register of research on subjective appreciation of life. www.eur.nl/fsw/happiness.
 


[1] Epicurus. "Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus." The Information Philosopher - Dedicated to the New Information Philosophy. Web. 24 Jan. 2012. <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/epicurus/letter_to_menoeceus.html>.
[2] Striker, Gisela. "Ataraxia: Happiness as tranquillity" Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge. England: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print.
[3] Aristotle, and Joe Sachs. "Book One. Chapters 4,5, and 6." Nicomachean Ethics. Newbury, MA: Focus Pub./R. Pullins, 2002. Print.
[4] Hughes, Gerard J. "The Fulfilled Life." Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge, 2001. 25. Print.
[5] Aristotle, and Joe Sachs. (VII, 14, 1154a 8-11)." Nicomachean Ethics. Newbury, MA: Focus Pub./R. Pullins, 2002. Print.
[6] Boylan, Michael. "Aristotle: Biology [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 02 Oct. 2004. Web. 24 Jan. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-bio/>.
[7] For example it is virtuous to have courage because it lies in the mean between being cowardly and acting rashly.
[8] Bergsma, Ad, Germaine Poot, and Aart C. Liefbroer. "Happiness in the Garden of Epicurus." Journal of Happiness Studies 9.3 (2008): 402. Print.
[9] Bergsma, Ad, Germaine Poot, and Aart C. Liefbroer. "Happiness in the Garden of Epicurus." Journal of Happiness Studies 9.3 (2008): 401. Print.
[10] Veenhoven, R. (2006). World Database of Happiness: Continuous register of research on subjective appreciation of life. www.eur.nl/fsw/happiness
[11] It it easy to imagine that the state of ataraxia is closer to that of sleep than fulfilment.
[12] Hughes, Gerard J. "Moral Virtues and Moral Training." Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge, 2001. 72. Print.
[13] For example one might go bungee jumping despite their initial fears because they realise that such a time calls for the virtue of courage (use of phronesis) and that the risks of harm are low (use of theoria).
[14] Russell, Bertrand. "The Epicureans." A History of Western Philosophy. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972. 244-45. Print.
[15] Bergsma, Ad, Germaine Poot, and Aart C. Liefbroer. "Happiness in the Garden of Epicurus." Journal of Happiness Studies 9.3 (2008): 412. Print.
[16] To be fair perhaps Epicurus' ethical ideas were comprehensive too, however very little remains of his (reportedly extensive) writings.
[17]  One does not have to be inclined towards the pursuit of theoretical knowledge (theoria), or even have had the suitable moral upbringing that is a prerequisite for Aristotle's students in order to practise Epicurean philosophy.

Sunday, December 18, 2011

#12 - More Parmenides

Ok, so I said my next post would be about Zeno's Paradoxes. . . It's not. It's more Parmenides. Actually it's the assignment I recently submitted on Parmenides. I didn't really get to explain myself too much because it's only a mid-semester essay and there was a wordcound of 1500 I had to abide by. Also the topic choices were all fairly dull. Hopefully I'll have something more exciting for the final essay, which will probably be on Aristotle's ethics.
Parmenides and Being
Parmenides is one of the original 'armchair philosophers', a rationalist who believed that through sheer power of thought one could overcome the toughest of philosophical problems. Parmenides is most notable for his enquiries into the nature of what is (or perhaps more importantly what is not) in his work 'On Nature'. It is arguably through this work that we gain two very important logical principals; the law of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. We do, however, also gain some less commonly accepted conclusions - The revelation that nothing changes, nothing moves, and everything is made up of one unified block of being. These claims certainly require some explanation and I will attempt to do so presently by investigating Parmenides' premises, Parmenides' conclusions, and the general coherency of his overall argument. I will attempt to translate Parmenides' arguments into logical notation and will finally put the formula to the test through the use of a thought experiment.

Parmenides begins his poetic prose by conjuring to mind the scenario in which he approaches a goddess in a chariot. The goddess informs Parmenides that there are two main ways of enquiry, enquires about what is (also called the 'path or persuasion') and enquiries about what is not. Of these two routes it is only the first that is truthful and valuable says the goddess. The justification for this is simple; to attempt to think or speak of something that is not is impossible because to even bring it to mind necessarily implies it's existence. To think or speak one must think or speak about something. As soon as one finds themselves thinking about that something it must necessarily exist. Thus Parmenides puts forth that the very notion of something 'not being' is contradictory.

Before moving on to the conclusions Parmenides draws from this argument it would be of use to clarify some key details of his argument. Firstly, when Parmenides refers to what is and what is not it must be understood that Parmenides is writing in a language that does not require an accompanying subject to give meaning to these seemingly fragmental phrases. Given this fact it is acceptable interpret the phrase it is as applying to anything at all and the phrase is not as referring to nothing.
Secondly, it may be noted that Parmenides equates the thoughts of things with the existence of the actual thing - or more precisely he doesn't recognise any differentiation between the physical and mental realms at all. This position is explicitly stated in section 3n when Parmenides claims:

                The same thing is there for thinking of and for being. (Parmenides. 3n)

 This worldview was not uncommon for the time and is known as monism. Monism refers to the view that the world is comprised of a single type of stuff, be this physical stuff, mental stuff, or otherwise. Philosophers who support the notion that everything is comprised of physical stuff are often called materialists (or advocates of physicalism), those who support the view that everything is made up of mental projections (for lack of space for a better description) are called idealists, and those who support the view that the world is made up of something else that is neither mental or physical are sometimes referred to as 'neutral monists'. (Palmer) Although the term came much later I would be tempted to call Parmenides a neutral monist as he believed that everything was made up of 'being'. I will further discuss the implications of my interpretation of Parmenides as a neutral monist later.
Returning now to Parmenides argument; Parmenides concluded that because it is nonsensical to speak of something not being things that exist must be eternal and unchanging. The reasoning behind this is that if something were to begin to exist (or cease existing) it would have to move from being nothing into being something (or vica versa). This transition would require meaningful discussion about something coming from nothing, a process that Parmenides finds problematic. Parmenides asserts that nothing comes from nothing ('ex nihilo nihil fit') and hence concludes that existing things must always have existed. Another consequence of taking Parmenides theories about what is and is not to their logical conclusions is a denial of time as we currently understand it. Time arguably involves change so without change there must be no time. This can be understood by imagining a world in which two consecutive world states are identical in every way. Would you be tempted to say that time had stopped for those moments? - I suspect that Parmenides would. The fact that we understand the events of the past, present, and future in different ways and perceive time as passing is simply an indication of the limitations of our human condition and does nothing towards proving that the passing of time is a real phenomenon. The only way to approach these sorts of problems is through rigorous logical reasoning (and not empirical observation) says Parmenides, and coins this type of enquiry as 'The path of persuasion'.
I will now attempt to formalise Parmenides argument and test it against a thought experiment that will expose it's difficulties.
First of all let's look at Parmenides’ premises as they appear most clearly. These seem to be:

P1)         Whatever can be spoken or thought of necessarily is. (Parmenides, Section 6n)
and
P2)         The Other: that it is not and it necessarily must not be. That, I point out to you, is a path              wholly unthinkable, for neither could you know what-is-not (for that is impossible), nor could             you point it out. (Parmenides, Section 2n, #2)
When interpreted as follows:
x = it is. (and it's negation accordingly 'it is not')
y = it can be thought and/or spoken about.
Parmenides premises become:
P1)  y ⊃ x
P2) ~y ⊃  ~x
These two premises actually lead to the conclusion that (y ≡ x). The transition from y ⊃ x and  ~y ⊃  ~x  to (y ≡ x) is shown to be valid in Appendix A.  
Given the interpretations outlined above consider the following thought experiment:
It is the year 2100. Unbeknownst to the citizens of earth there is a substance in the centre of the earth that is completely unlike any other substance every examined. It is neither solid, nor liquid, nor gas, nor is it similar or comparable to anything ever observed. Understandably no sentient being ever mentions this substance because it would be impossible to do so with the current knowledge that the citizens of earth have about what can and does exist. However in the year 2200 this mystery substance is discovered and labelled 'Mysterium'. From 2200 onwards people regularly think and talk about Mysterium.
Let us refer to 'mysterium' as it.
In 2100 it is not thought and or spoken about. Therefore, according to P2, it is not.
In 2200 it is thought and spoken about. Therefore, according to P1, it is.
However this seems to contradict Parmenides conclusions that things do not come into being. What was not in 2100 ('mysterium') is in 2200. This conflicts with Parmenides account of being when he explicitly states :

                Thus it must completely be or be not. (Allen, Fragment 8)

 So either my thought experiment is misrepresentative or there is a flaw in Parmenides' argument. I will now try and explain why, given the same premises, Parmenides and I reach different conclusions.

The problem is somewhat similar to the one that George Berkeley faced when he realized that things could essentially pop in and out of existence depending on whether a sentient being perceived it. Berkeley solved this problem by appealing to the omnipresent nature of God who prevents things from constantly coming in and out of existence by always perceiving them. Parmenides could potentially make a similar argument and say that the 'mysterium' had indeed existed the whole time and God had perceived it. There is, however, not sufficient evidence to suggest that Parmenides had this type of solution in mind and the application of Occam's Razor would dictate that such a clause be omitted.
The question therefore remains: What is the status of objects that escape our epistemological grasp?
When a dualist position is adopted the solution is easy: Simply explain that the 'mysterium' had probably always existed but we just hadn't perceived it. For the monist the problem is far more difficult. Due to word-length constraints I cannot elaborate very much upon this point however if my arguments are flawed it would probably be due to mis-representing Parmenides as a strict monist. I do believe, however, that this claim is not without evidence and therefore holdfast that the above thought experiment poses a problem with Parmenides' theory.

***********************

Reference List

Allen, R.E. 1966. 'The Eleatics'. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle. New York: The Free Press. pp. 44-49.

Palmer, John, "Parmenides", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/parmenides/>.

Parmenides, On Nature, (http://home.ican.net/~arandall/Parmenides/Parm.html)

Russell, Bertrand. The History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.

Stubenberg, Leopold, "Neutral Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/neutral-monism/>.

APPENDIX A
X
Y
y ⊃ x
~y ⊃  ~x
y ≡x
0
0
                  0 1 0     
    10 1 10
        010
0
1
                  1 0 0
    01 1 10
        100
1
0
                  0 1 1           
    10 0 01
        001
1
1
                  1 1 1        
    01 1 01
        111

(y ⊃ x),  ( ~y ⊃  ~x)  ⊨ (y ≡ x)
The argument form above is valid because in every case in which the premises are both true the conclusion is also true.