Elitism in J.S. Mill's
Utilitarianism
"It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is only
because they only know their side of the question. The other party to the
comparison knows both sides." (Utilitarianism - J.S. Mill)
It is this quote, parroted in ethics classes that slowly
bugged me more and more while studying moral philosophy. Doesn't it just seem
to reek of elitism? I thought it did and because of this slowly moved away from
Mill's two-tiered conception of pleasures (lower and higher - bodily and
intellectual, etc) to Bentham's more 'pure' conception of utility that is based
on only intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty and propinquity/remoteness.
Recently, however, I read an article by D.D. Raphael[1] that led me to reconsider Mill's utilitarianism, or at least led me to drop my accusations of elitism on him. The passage in particular that appealed to me was this one:
Recently, however, I read an article by D.D. Raphael[1] that led me to reconsider Mill's utilitarianism, or at least led me to drop my accusations of elitism on him. The passage in particular that appealed to me was this one:
"It is possible for Mill to maintain, as he does, that
it is quite consistent with hedonism to say that the pleasure of philosophy is
better in kind than the pleasure of rolling in mud - so long as he also
maintains that the qualitatively higher pleasures are superior in quantity as
well." (pg 11)
D.D Raphael's interpretation of Mill might look something
like this:
Whilst the fool is
completely satisfied they are still not be as satisfied as Socrates. The scale
on the above graph should represent absolute pleasure (10 representing bliss
and 0 being nothingness). It's not that the fool isn't happy - the fool is
indeed happy, as happy as he can possibly be! It's just that the fool is
unaware that his potential for happiness could be increased if he were to take
up poetry instead of pushpin. Socrates, on the other hand, is dissatisfied because
there is a gap between his potential pleasure (the pleasures of philosophy
perhaps) and his actual pleasure. So if we take an absolute perspective on
happiness based on something fairly objective (maybe the level of endorphins and
serotonin in someone's body) we can understand that it's completely possible to
be dissatisfied yet still happier than someone who is completely satisfied.
Being satisfied isn't everything - it matters the extent of the pleasure that
is derived from the satisfaction too.
I think that this is the most charitable interpretation of
Mill because it avoids jumping to the conclusion that there is something
metaphysically different between the higher and lower pleasures. Instead it is
conluded that whilst both pleasures have the same quality (pleasure is pleasure
no matter what its source) it is impossible that a lower pleasure can ever
exceed a higher pleasure in terms of gross utility. So this type of thing would
be inconceivable to Mill:
In this case although Socrates is engaging in higher
pleasures he still has less overall pleasure than the fool. This does not
compute for Mill. He says:
"It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained
equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly
preferred the lower...From this verdict of only the competent judges, I apprehend
there can be no appeal...What means are there of determining which is the
acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except
the general sufferage of those who are familiar with both?"
The underlying argument here is simply that somebody who has
experienced both higher and lower pleasures would always choose the higher
pleasure. The temptation is to flatly deny this argument and say something like
"But right now I'd much rather have sex than be working on my metaphysics
essay, philosophise that Mill!" and D.D Raphael does exactly that. Raphael
responds:
"Could not the fool and the pig retort in kind? Socrates knows all about mental pleasures but not enough about bodily [pleasures]. The pig has no capacity to enjoy philosophy, but Socrates has spend so much time on philosophy that he has not given rolling in the mud a decent chance. He does not know the exquisite pleasure that it can bring to those who go in for it in a big way."
"Could not the fool and the pig retort in kind? Socrates knows all about mental pleasures but not enough about bodily [pleasures]. The pig has no capacity to enjoy philosophy, but Socrates has spend so much time on philosophy that he has not given rolling in the mud a decent chance. He does not know the exquisite pleasure that it can bring to those who go in for it in a big way."
I wholeheartedly
agree with Raphael. It is entirely conceivable that a lower pleasure could
bring more utility than a higher pleasure and the attitude in which the pleasure
is approached probably influences the utility derived also. I do not doubt that
Mill gets more pleasure from philosophy than eating or sex. But maybe the
reason that this is so is because he presupposed his conclusion beforehand and
hence psychologically tricked himself into enjoying the food and sex less and
the philosophy more. Perhaps cultural and societal influences were at play here
- people who enjoy food are called gluttons, people who enjoy sex are deviants,
etc, etc.
Overall I still rather like Mill as a utilitarian but I'm
looking forward to moving on and reading some Sidgwick for his more egalitarian
account of pleasure as "desirable consciousness of any kind".
[1] Raphael, D.D., Bentham and the
Varieties of Utilitarianism, in: B. Parekh (Hrsg.), Jeremy Bentham: Critical
Assessments, London 1993.

