Elitism in J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism

Elitism in J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism

"It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is only because they only know their side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." (Utilitarianism - J.S. Mill) 

It is this quote, parroted in ethics classes that slowly bugged me more and more while studying moral philosophy. Doesn't it just seem to reek of elitism? I thought it did and because of this slowly moved away from Mill's two-tiered conception of pleasures (lower and higher - bodily and intellectual, etc) to Bentham's more 'pure' conception of utility that is based on only intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty and propinquity/remoteness.

Recently, however, I read an article by D.D. Raphael[1] that led me to reconsider Mill's utilitarianism, or at least led me to drop my accusations of elitism on him. The passage in particular that appealed to me was this one:

"It is possible for Mill to maintain, as he does, that it is quite consistent with hedonism to say that the pleasure of philosophy is better in kind than the pleasure of rolling in mud - so long as he also maintains that the qualitatively higher pleasures are superior in quantity as well." (pg 11)

D.D Raphael's interpretation of Mill might look something like this:

 Whilst the fool is completely satisfied they are still not be as satisfied as Socrates. The scale on the above graph should represent absolute pleasure (10 representing bliss and 0 being nothingness). It's not that the fool isn't happy - the fool is indeed happy, as happy as he can possibly be! It's just that the fool is unaware that his potential for happiness could be increased if he were to take up poetry instead of pushpin. Socrates, on the other hand, is dissatisfied because there is a gap between his potential pleasure (the pleasures of philosophy perhaps) and his actual pleasure. So if we take an absolute perspective on happiness based on something fairly objective (maybe the level of endorphins and serotonin in someone's body) we can understand that it's completely possible to be dissatisfied yet still happier than someone who is completely satisfied. Being satisfied isn't everything - it matters the extent of the pleasure that is derived from the satisfaction too. 

I think that this is the most charitable interpretation of Mill because it avoids jumping to the conclusion that there is something metaphysically different between the higher and lower pleasures. Instead it is conluded that whilst both pleasures have the same quality (pleasure is pleasure no matter what its source) it is impossible that a lower pleasure can ever exceed a higher pleasure in terms of gross utility. So this type of thing would be inconceivable to Mill:

In this case although Socrates is engaging in higher pleasures he still has less overall pleasure than the fool. This does not compute for Mill. He says:

"It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower...From this verdict of only the competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal...What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general sufferage of those who are familiar with both?"

The underlying argument here is simply that somebody who has experienced both higher and lower pleasures would always choose the higher pleasure. The temptation is to flatly deny this argument and say something like "But right now I'd much rather have sex than be working on my metaphysics essay, philosophise that Mill!" and D.D Raphael does exactly that. Raphael responds:

"Could not the fool and the pig retort in kind? Socrates knows all about mental pleasures but not enough about bodily [pleasures]. The pig has no capacity to enjoy philosophy, but Socrates has spend so much time on philosophy that he has not given rolling in the mud a decent chance. He does not know the exquisite pleasure that it can bring to those who go in for it in a big way." 

 I wholeheartedly agree with Raphael. It is entirely conceivable that a lower pleasure could bring more utility than a higher pleasure and the attitude in which the pleasure is approached probably influences the utility derived also. I do not doubt that Mill gets more pleasure from philosophy than eating or sex. But maybe the reason that this is so is because he presupposed his conclusion beforehand and hence psychologically tricked himself into enjoying the food and sex less and the philosophy more. Perhaps cultural and societal influences were at play here - people who enjoy food are called gluttons, people who enjoy sex are deviants, etc, etc. 

Overall I still rather like Mill as a utilitarian but I'm looking forward to moving on and reading some Sidgwick for his more egalitarian account of pleasure as "desirable consciousness of any kind".

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[1] Raphael, D.D., Bentham and the Varieties of Utilitarianism, in: B. Parekh (Hrsg.), Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments, London 1993.

Utilitarianism, David Benatar, and Thought Experiments.

This blog post is a response to another philosophy blogger (blog here) who argues that utilitarianism becomes hard to swallow when considering a certain thought experiment. I discuss some interesting new philosophical literature that might, if accepted, provide reasons to doubt the strength of the thought experiment. I'm not sure (yet...) whether I accept the counter-argument I present but I think it is definitely food for thought (plus I've been wanting to blog about Benatar for a while now :P). The thought experiment is, as worded in the original post, as follows:

Imagine you are some sort of inter-dimensional space-time traveler, and you wind up in the following situation. You can create a better world than Earth in a new parallel universe (maybe you can do this by time-travel, or creating a mirror-universe somehow, or some other possibility). Now the new world is not an exact copy of our Earth. It is very similar, and has the same population, but it has different individual people in it. More importantly, there is some important and concrete way in which Earth Mark II is plainly superior – from a utilitarian perspective – to our Earth. Maybe in Earth Mk.II Hitler never existed, or racism, nationalism or religious intolerance never really took hold for some reason. As a result, there is more peace, trust, prosperity and diversity in the new world, and as a result more happiness. Or maybe there are just better supplies of safe drinking water in Africa, or terrific alternative energy-sources that don’t inject carbon into the atmosphere. Choose whatever you like that would make our world and its prospects better if we had it.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that to create that world you need to destroy our world (imagine that we need to demolish this planet in order to perform the mapping process that creates the almost mirror-image of Earth in the other universe).

Should you do it?

Breakey assumes that the utilitarian response would be to advocate the construction of the parallel universe in place of the current universe. He then states that destroying the existing world would also destroy the hopes and dreams of all the world's current people and that this move would not be justified by the creation of a 'super-happy' new world. Breakey discusses the problems that utilitarianism faces if potential people are given the same status as existing people; if this is the case peoples lives become mere vessels for carrying happiness and can be traded for the lives of people who could potentially be happier. This, for Breakey, is a serious concern.

As a utilitarian myself I am always keen to try and defend the theory against counter-arguments and I think this objection can be countered too. In short I would like to deny that the utilitarian is obligated to create "Earth Mark II" in place of the current earth. I think that the intuitively immoral consequences of this thought experiment can be escaped if one accepts certain arguments about the status of potential persons.  I believe it is the duty of the utilitarian to make 'people happy', rather than making 'happy people'. I will try to sketch out my reasons for this below:

The first assumption that must be accepted in order for the thought experiment to appear repugnant is that the destruction of the world will cause suffering to the inhabitants of the world. If the destruction of the world involves a slow and painful demise of all sentient creatures it is obvious how this might be the case. Both hedonistic utilitarians (like myself) and preference utilitarians can agree that this would be a bad thing because pain is intrinsically bad and unpleasant, and people generally have a preference to avoid pain.

But it might be the case that the destruction of Earth1.0 is not slow and painful but instead ephemeral and painless. If this is the case a preference utilitarian might want to argue that they would experience harm due to one's 'preference to continue living' being violated. Already I find this problematic because, as I have argued here, I do not understand how something impossible to perceive (like 'being dead') can be a harm at all. Hence I do not think that the world being destroyed is necessarily a bad thing provided that the destruction of Earth1.0 is unperceived (instantaneous, painless, unexpected, etc) - In this case there is no change in the utility of the agents involved and no recognition of an unfulfilled preference. This sort of argument, however, might be unconvincing to the type of preference utilitarian who holds that even unperceived-unfulfilled-preferences cause harm. Furthermore there is nothing in the thought experiment that suggests that the destruction of World1.0 would be either unperceived or painless.  

So, looking at the destruction of Earth1.0 as a stand-alone event it can be considered acceptable if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes no displeasure.

b) You are the type of preference utilitarian that believes that a preference must be perceived in order to cause pain and the destruction of Earth1.0 is not perceived (either before, during, or after the destruction).

On the other hand the destruction of Earth1.0 can be considered harmful if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes pain to sentient beings; or

b) You are a preference utilitarian with a preference to live which is denied through the destruction of Earth1.0    

But is the pain caused by the destruction of Earth1.0 (either through direct experience or through unsatisfied preferences) counteracted in a utilitarian calculus by the pleasure that will be experienced by the inhabitants of Earth2.0?  

To answer this I would like to share an argument put forth by David Benatar in his book "Better Never to Have Been". Benatar highlights that there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. His premises are:

1) The presence of pain is bad;

2) The presence of pleasure is good;

3) The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.

4) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

The most ambiguous and contested premise is probably the third one - It seems strange to think that the absence of pain can be good even if there is no-one around to experience it. Benatar explains that this premise must be thought of retrospectively in terms of the person that may have existed. For example think of a severely disabled person who suffers enormous amounts of untreatable pain and claims that she wishes that she was never born. This desire seems to make sense even though in the alternative world that she imagines she would not be there to appreciate her non-existence. This scenario supports premise 3 that 'The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone'. It seems uncontroversial to say that we might even have a 'duty' to prevent bringing people into existence that we know will suffer a great amount. The reason we wish not to bring these people into existence is because we feel that they are better off not-existing than experiencing the harms of existence.

So we agree (hopefully) that the absence of pain is good, even if the person that it is good for does not exist. The converse, however, does not follow. We do not seem to think that the absence of pleasure is bad unless there is somebody to experience this 'bad-ness'. To use another example we do not feel that we have a duty to bring happy people into existence. When we consider a couple that have the financial, emotional, and genetic means to have a happy child but choose not to procreate we do not consider them morally repugnant. The potential child experiences no harm in its non-existence despite the fact that it could have experienced great pleasure through existence. This argument supports premise 4 that 'the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation'.

There is a lot more to the argument that I have skimmed over for the purposes of brevity but I think the general direction that Benatar is headed is obvious. He illustrates his point using this matrix:

Benatar's argument is simple: Scenario B (non-existence) is preferable to Scenario A (existence). A 'good' + a 'not bad' is better than a 'bad' + a 'good'. If Benatar's argument is sound (and I'm still trying to establish whether or not it is myself) then the thought experiment proposed by Breakey must be seen in a different light. If one adopts Benatars outlook there would be no benefit in creating a whole new world full of people that otherwise would have not existed. The reason is that their non-existence is not a harm and that the pleasure that they are deprived off in non-existence is not experienced by anyone. Seen in this light the existence of Earth2.0 causes people that did not exist to exist, and, as seen in the matrix, this is arguably a bad move.

To return to the original thought experiment destroying Earth1.0 is only done because it is a necessary step in bringing Earth2.0 into existence and the existence of Earth2.0 is considered more beneficial than Earth1.0. But coming into existence is, according to Benatar, not a benefit at all - So there is no reason to consider destroying Earth1.0 in the first place! In fact Benatar would probably argue that the best state of being is in neither Earth1.0 or Earth 2.0 but non-existence. Nontheless there is no reason for mass-genocide because as Benatar points out there is an important distinction between lives worth continuing and lives worth starting. It might be that now, since we're alive, we might as well continue living. However were we to somehow objectively view our lives we would, argues Benatar, be no worse if we didn't exist then if we had the most pleasurable life imaginable.  

I admit that Benatar's argument is quite radical and I'm still working my way through his book to see whether I can agree with him, but so far I find his arguments hard to escape. The implications of his argument are far reaching and lead to an anti-natalist position. . . So part of me is hoping that there is a massive flaw in his argument somewhere so I can escape his conclusions.  

There is a great blog post on Benatar's writings here which deals with Benatar's central thesis in a lot more detail than I have in this post.

As always I welcome any comments or criticisms. 

Some thougths about Utilitarianism and the Felicific Calculus.

CENTRAL TENET OF HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM: Morally right acts increase aggregate happiness. Happiness is measured as a subjective experience of pleasure.  

  

Assuming that we are trying to be perfect Utilitarians:

P1 - We should aim to perform perfect felicific calculus's. (see here)

P2 - Perfect felicific calculus's are conducted with a complete knowledge of all the 'relevant facts' involved.

P3 - We are ignorant about what the 'relevant facts' in a scenario will be until we encounter the scenario in which the felicific calculus is required.

C1 - Therefore ANY fact should be considered valuable because it is a potentially 'relevant fact'. (And the possession of 'relevant facts' is a necessary condition for conducting a reliable felicific calculus)

C2 - Therefore we should aim to gather as many facts about the world as possible.

P4 - We gather facts about the world through our direct and indirect experiences.

C3 - Therefore we should maximise our direct and indirect experiences.

We can reach C2 and C3 through the uncontroversial P1. I am concerned, however, with the implications of C3 and whether or not it is compatible with the central tenets of Utilitarianism.

I am defining 'direct experiences' as being something that we intimately experience and interpret into knowledge ourselves, i.e. learning about Japanese culture through going to Japan. Indirect experiences are equally important when the direct experience is not available; an example of an indirect experience might be reading a book about Japanese culture. In the second example the reader gains a direct experience of 'book-reading' and an indirect experience of Japanese culture. I cannot perceive of any other way that we might come to gain knowledge other than through direct and indirect experiences. I admit that just because someone has an experience it doesn't mean that it necessarily translates to knowledge. There are often examples of experience without knowledge (caused through a failure to observe or synthesize information). But there are never cases of knowledge without experience (excepting perhaps ingrained biological 'knowledge'). 

In order for experiences to be effectively turned into knowledge one must possess what I'd like to call 'philosophical virtues', or in other words one must be inclined to understand the world in a certain way. This idea falls broadly under the umbrella of Virtue Epistemology. Virtue Epistemology is a relatively new strand of philosophy that looks at the way that we understand the world and turn our observations into knowledge. Virtue Epistemologists follow in the Aristotelian tradition of looking at the quality of the reasons behind the judgement rather than the consequences of the judgement itself. It might seem bizarre to introduce something like virtues into a consequentialist theory however I believe it is entirely appropriate. Instead of defining virtues as things like courage, honesty, integrity, etc, I would like to define virtues as being 'tendencies to view the world such that sufficient data is obtained in order to conduct a felicific calculus'. Valued qualities in making a judgement might include things such as conscientiousness or open-mindedness. Another virtue might include the capacity to recognize unreliable evidence, e.g. testimony. It is these 'epistemological virtues' that mark the difference between those that can effectively conduct a felicific calculus and those that cannot. 

Provided that one possesses these aforementioned virtues there is no reason why every new experience couldn't provide the agent with a greater knowledge-bank to be used in future decision making. In fact, if one accepts the central tenet of hedonistic utilitarianism and the links between the premises above, one is obliged to have as many of these new experiences as possible. This is, I guess, the crux of my argument.

What happens, however, when one is faced with a choice between an option that will definitively increase pleasure and another option that will definitively increase knowledge?  The essence of utilitarianism is to increase total pleasure, however, as we have seen, this entails that knowledge be maximised too. How, given our ignorance of future states, should we decide on a course of action in such circumstances? 

For example imagine that you are at a Chinese restaurant and are offered either ice cream (your current favourite desert) or a traditional Chinese desert in which you know nothing about whatsoever. As far as you know the pleasure that you will receive from eating the traditional Chinese desert is a mystery - It might be horrible, or it might replace ice-cream as your favourite. In trying to be the best Utilitarian that you can be, what should you do?

I would argue that one should try the mystery Chinese desert even though there is a risk of discovering that it gives less pleasure than the ice-cream. The reason is that the world contains an admittedly large, but still finite, amount of experiences that can be had. This means that it is very likely than many experiences will be had more than once. If utilitarianism is adopted as a life-long system of morality acting in accordance with C3 (and hence maximising new experiences) this makes it more likely that felicific calculus's will be accurately conducted in the future.  Every new experience gives knowledge about a previously mysterious variable. This is how I propose that the alleged epistemological deficiencies of the utilitarian can be countered. One should only be deficient in knowledge of the pleasure potential of a particular course of action once per each unique action. This is because after acknowledging that they do not know whether the action beings about pleasure or not they will choose above all other options it in order to gain knowledge about it. 

There is one important exception that I make to this rule. This exception applies to choices between courses of action that have already been experienced and are known to be pleasurable and courses of action that have not been directly experienced but that one has reason to believe (through indirect knowledge) that the experience would be unpleasant. To return to the Chinese Restaurant example this would be a scenario in which your choice is still between the ice-cream and the traditional Chinese desert except that this time you are not in complete ignorance in regards to the Chinese dish. Your friend who is accompanying you says that he once had it and found it unpleasant. Here you are in a very difficult position. Whilst you know that things like 'taste' are quite subjective you also acknowledge that hitherto your food preferences have been very similar to this person. You do not like the idea of subjecting yourself to easily avoidable (and perhaps likely) displeasure, yet at the same time you recognise this moment as an opportunity to increase your knowledge about the world.

In these circumstances I would argue that it doesn't matter which option is chosen - the formula's can step aside here.There are merits to trying new things, however it is rash to deny pleasure for the sake of new experiences in all situations. There will be times in which one simply wants the pleasure of a comforting and familiar taste and doesn't like the potential risk for having an unpleasant experience. The decision to settle for such a thing is understandable and justifiable.

The decision making apparatus I would suggest in conjunction with the felicific calculus would look something like this:

Decision making matrix with 2 variables.	Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	Have not experienced in any way.
Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	1. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the pleasant option.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose either option. Both are valuable.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	2. Choose the pleasant option.	6. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	3. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	7. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	10. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	4. Choose either option. Both are valuable.	8. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	11. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	13. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have not experienced in any way.	5. Choose the unexperienced option.	9. Choose the unexperienced option.	12. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	14. Choose the unexperienced option.	15. Choose at random.

EXPLANATIONS:

 Squares 1, 6, 10, 13 and 15 are straight-forward decisions and can be made fairly easily provided tha tone possesses the epistemological virtues required to conduct an accurate felicific calculus.

Square 15 is similarly straight-forward - when choosing in absolute ignorance it really doesn't matter which path is chosen.

Decisions made in squares 2 and 11 show that, all other factors being equal, pleasure is chosen over displeasure.  

Decisions made in squares 3 and 7 show that paths that are indirectly known to be pleasurable should always be chosen. This is because it turns indirect knowledge into direct knowledge and because pleasure is, of course, a worthy goal.

The proposed decision to be made in square 8 shows that direct knowledge is taken to be more trustworthy than indirect knowledge. For this reason indirect displeasure is chosen for there is a chance that the knowledge received is faulty and, in fact, the path may prove to be pleasurable.

In square 5 I suggest that one should choose the unknown experience. This is because going from no knowledge whatsoever to direct knowledge represents a very valuable move.  

Square 9 is a rather intuitive decision - if you know that one of the options is certainly unpleasant you might as well try your luck with absolute chance.

In square 12 I advocate that that the indirectly experienced pleasurable experience be chosen over the unknown experience. This is because it I consider direct experiences to be the most valuable type. Although taking a risk on the unknown option may pay pleasurable dividends there is the risk that it may not. Conversely there is a good chance that the indirectly pleasurable experience may turn out to be directly pleasurable. And a move from indirect to direct knowledge is valuable in itself.

Square 14 is again rather intuitive. Whatever option is chosen there will be the benefit of gaining direct knowledge. It makes sense to take a risk on the mystery choice rather than accepting what will probably be an unpleasant experience.

Square 4 is the most interesting square on the matrix. It is what might be called the 'freedom square'. When one is faced with this type of decision I do not think that there is any more merit in either option than the other. It is certainly a noble move to choose the indirectly unpleasant experience in order to fully understand whether it is unpleasant it actually is (and how unpleasant it is), however when faced with the competing choice of definitive pleasure it is entirely acceptable to forgo such a choice.

I imagine that a person who chooses to live this way for an entire lifetime would have an immense range of pleasant and unpleasant experiences; she would be vastly knowledgeable and quite different to the typical portrayal of the shallow, pleasure seeking utilitarian stuck on an endless hedonic treadmill. I believe that the move I have just made from P1 to C3 is a necessary, albeit not revolutionary, move that needs to made to increase the legitimacy of utilitarianism. Ascertaining how widespread pleasure is best achieved is a vast empirical challenge and requires a great deal of inter-disciplinary knowledge from biology to psychology to cultural studies and beyond. Whatever criticisms that you may have towards utilitarianism any claim that it is overly simple is simply false.  

I believe that something along the lines of the argument I have just presented must be adopted if one is seriously considering adopting utilitarianism as a long term morality. I have begun opening myself up to a range of new experiences recently as part or my moral and personal development. It's incredible how often something that something you have avoided because of mere heresy turns out to be quite pleasurable. Recent examples include going vegetarian - I suspected it would be awful and difficult when really it just forced me to make more creative (and still delicious) meals. Another beneficial example of actively pursuing new experiences has been forcing myself to read things that I'd heard negative reviews about. I read 'The Moral Landscape' by Sam Harris recently and actually quite enjoyed it despite all the negative reviews I'd read. Sure, it wasn't perfect but it wasn't horrible any where near as horrible as some of the reviews I'd read. The same goes for Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. . . sort of. . . well actually as it turned out the hearsay I heard was partly true - I got a little overwhelmed and bored by the sheer size of the thing; BUT, nevertheless I can now actively participate in conversations about Rand and Harris without merely regurgitating common-places. Maximising experiences not only helps you be a better utilitarian it also helps fight the spread of dogmatic belief!

The Nature and Value of our Human Essence

The Nature and Value of our Human Essence

Holy wow, I'm really high. My attention span is so short right now that typing this seems like a miracle. Riding my bike home was a miracle. I could feel the boundaries between dreams and reality becoming blurred. It was like my subconscious was king. It was dark but I kept seeing the path I was riding on as becoming lighter. Between brief moments of regular perception I would see light beams through the trees, feel warm, and blissfully, perfectly happy. It felt like I was recalling a fond memory of having done this ride before, as a child maybe. Yet it was my first time having done this ride.

I said 'miracle' but 'miracle' suggests religious influence - This is not the sense of the word I mean. What I mean is that everything seemed (and continues to seem) miraculous, wonderful and confusing. I feel like an inquisitive child taking delight in seeing the world free from the influences that afflict our sense of self in adulthood. My body feels warm and tired, yet part of me races off chasing wonders and distractions. I'm swaying erratically while trying to write and am constantly wanting to find interest in smaller and smaller things. I want to prove to myself that I can find more wonder in less, to increase my wonder in spite of lesser influence. Sometimes that's what it's felt like. It feels different now and in my increasing sobriety I'd like to describe my bicycle ride home.

It was like the best kind of compulsory mission. The type that you know is compulsory yet the fact you know it is compulsory is no hindrance to the well-being of the mind nor body. The body follows, obeys, and chases, and the greater you is pulled too. Though it has no other choice the greater mind follows. But you enjoy it. The greater you enjoys it's paralytic tug and obedience of the brainstem because it is relieved of greater tasks. It is relieved of following order, of following the incessantly vocal inner monologue. The self that proudly states itself as master yet is too much an infant of evolution to grasp the knowledge of it’s true nature. Maybe the answer, the philosophy, will never develop. Maybe it has not proven evolutionally beneficial to question such things. Or maybe evolution simply doesn’t apply to the greater self. Presumably, even if it did, these people, these thinkers of the things, would drive themselves insane contemplating the elusive wonder of the greater self. So the greater self has wonder too, but just in chasing different things. Chasing better things? We'd like to think so. But the red herrings in our thoughts reveal more about us as second order beings (frankfurt) than do our bodily transmutations. And there are many red-herrings.

What is the essence of the human being? Perhaps you would argue that our second order volitions are what is important. This would be mightily filled with a philosopher-superiority complex. To claim spuriously that only those who have developed 2nd order volitions are the bearers of true human essence would be to mistakenly overlook a crucial question - Should we be assessed according to our processes (our mechanical jolts of neural power), or should we be judged by the far richer mechanical nature within the greater machine - The greater self? The machine that develops within the machine that almost seems independent enough to run off on it's own but cannot reach this goal yet. The intricate but dependant crux that has escaped it's master in it's dreams only but can still taste this freedom - It seems like a worthy choice. Despite the typical philosophical arrogance found in claiming that exercises of the brain indicate superiority I pain to say that I cannot escape it's allure.

Here is why.

Our mechanical jolts would interest a scientist god, and interests like this should remain with them. We should not assume that we are the masters of our own creation. That would be absurd. Where would we create from? We would certainly not create from the 'us' as we know it. The place that we experience life from is our 'greater self' under both meanings of 'greater'. It is larger (in the size of 'human essence') and also better (more great). We are living a distinctly human life in our thoughts, not our digestion. To say that those with more advanced 2nd order thinking are now more deserving of praise than the lesser 2nd order thinkers would be to jump forward too enthusiastically. It would be akin to the current worthy criticism of racists. To criticise that they are of a different race to you is senseless because even if there were something intrinsically bad about certain races (a statement I disagree with) that person didn't seem to choose their position. Only a manifestation of a 2nd order desire in the physical world is truly free. Whether one experiences this manifestation within them is determined. This is where the concepts of morally right and wrong and morally praiseworthy or blameworthy need to be distinguished. The 2nd order thinker may be 'objectively better' (more on that later) but not more praiseworthy.

 The same reason that this criticism of racists seems sound applies in parallel with the question of whether 2nd order volitions (or something else) contains what could be called the human essence. Humans have their mechanical structures evolve; But our tendency to seek 2nd order desires hasn't done the same. This seems to prove that the mind can operate free of evolution when pursuing 2nd order desires.  It doesn't seem as if the collective amount of '2nd order volitions-holders’ has increased in accordance with the rest of our evolutionary benefits. Surely the philosophical greats would have realised that they are the possessors of human essence only to the extent that they can dominate over their mechanical selves through their higher order thinking.  Yet this assumption does not seem to fit with the evolutionary argument (which must be inherently and entirely physicalist) and with our perceptions of time. In fact the number of 2nd Order Volition realizations has probably diminished over time in opposition to the increasing mechanical changes that we call evolution. So our 2nd order volition realisations must be able to operate external to evolutionary influences, which would mean that they must be a made of something non-physical, something metaphysically different to everything else. Is this our soul? A diminishing (if one believes 'diminishing' to be the case) of the mind, or even a non-changing amount of 2nd order volition realizations over time, would disprove it's possibility to be a part of the evolutionary process. To argue that 2nd order volitions have evolved would be to argue that we have become at least slightly more 2nd order volition aware than Socrates (or Plato, or Epicurus, or maybe even the more recent Mill!), and this is an enormously large claim. If this were to be true than why are these geniuses so shy in expressing their epiphanies to the world?! Couldn't science benefit? And (assuming this theory is tenable) wouldn't widespread realization of 2nd order volitions in turn influence our evolutionary compass so that it directs us towards a life of greater human essence? My wavering scientific knowledge inhibits me a little here but I tentatively claim that 'yes', it would do so very slowly - at the speed of evolution in fact.

This is why I pursue philosophy. Because right now I feel that philosophy can lead to the discovery of 2nd order volitions in a direct path, and this in turn would benefit our consequential well-being seeking because the acknowledgement of second order volitions also comes with great pleasure. I think that the refinement of this theory is best done by philosophers, the application of this theory best discovered through science and it's promotion (which is – consequentially speaking – the most essential part) should be done by anyone and everyone - In this case it's me. We should want to see the flourishing of these 2nd order volition seekers achieved through whatever method possible because they have discovered the 'true human essence' - The true expression of ourselves. This part of the self is the hedonistic place that Bentham and Tännsjö are looking for. Their aim was worthy but their eyes were faulty. Happiness is truly the greatest good. It is probably also expressed in hedonic pleasure, and that only. But in humans the apex of pleasure is connected to development of the 2nd orders volitions. So their aim, though the most worthy of all possible aims, was ever so slightly impeded by missing the connection between hedonistic bliss and securing desires of the second order. Securing second order desires can be motivated by a realization that our pleasure response is a reward of evolution, pleasure tells us we are on the right track. It is a standard and constant physical norm and attractor. Since the dawn of time pleasure has felt good and we have instinctively, egoistically, gone and pursued it. It is when we acknowledge this and accept it that we can realise that when we pursue the maximization of 2nd order desire realisations we also are pursuing that pleasurable, self-interested, mechanical pull of the primal self. The pursuit of 2^nd order desires can be justified in a hedonistic sense. People don't know this, but it is in the best interests of both the mechanical and the greater self that they obligingly follow this pull. You can open people's eyes to that. With the knowledge, you can. And perhaps you should. Maybe that is the one and only justification to paternalism.

That:

When reasonable expectations of greater 2nd order volition development are predicted as a consequence of an action infringements on liberty that are incurred in the completion of this action may be accepted as a form of 'loving paternalistic life re-direction'. 

The liberty infringement may be rather high however their potential for self-meaning illumination would surely always swing this metaphysical felicific calculus in favour of enlightenment. This ‘enlightenment’ being the possession of the true human essence through the recognition of the links between 2nd order desires and the happiness caused by these same desires.

2nd Order volition theory (according to Frankfurt) goes hand in hand with the hedonistic pleasure theories of Bentham and the collision of the 2 leads to some interesting conclusions.

1) That 2nd order volition realisations actually result in a discovery of the true essence of humanity - that the pursuit of the pleasures of the body is only fully achieved to the extent that one develops their thinking to seek 2nd order volitions.      

2) That philosophy - or whatever means best achieves the most recognition of 2nd order volitions- ought to be taught. (Moral Prescription)

I say all of the above with the bashfulness of the most modest of philosophers. I profess that this is merely my knowledge so far and to say I've hit the crux of my knowledge would be arrogant at the age of 21. Nonetheless it seems so obvious to me that this is the case. It is in my nature that nothing makes me happier than when I realise that I am the captain of my ship despite the uncontrollable forces of the ocean. I can only presume that this bliss can be experienced by others. Given that I am not a strange anomaly (oh please, no) I can be justified, consequentially speaking, for vehemently pursuing conditions that lead to greater 2nd order volitions in myself and others. This goal essentially becomes the new intrinsic good and brings with it the obligations to pursue it.

Utilitarianism is correct, the intrinsic good should be maximised. Only it wrongly defines the intrinsic good as happiness, assuming that the one that bugs 'but why is that pursued?' is speaking nonsensically. That person would actually be speaking quite legitimately. The answer is 'because it leads to the production of 2nd order desires and hence the discovery of the human essence', and with a full knowledge of  the theories  of Frankfurt and the Hedonistic Utilitarians I think that the connection between happiness and 2nd order desires is evidently the final say. No further can one be bug bugged 'but why is that pursued?' because (for reasons stated in this essay) the actualization of 2nd order desires is so evidently the final word in the story; no, the full-stop. That being said, the apparentness of this theory to me may be afflicted with a logical flaw - and if so I implore you to find it. Content your desire to point it out to me and I will be equally content in that I can now satisfy my 2nd Order desire to further develop philosophically by correcting and refining this theory.

AFTERWORD:

This piece of writing started with the descriptions of my internal experiences while high. So where does the strange but briefly beautiful servitude of the 2nd Order Volition seeking mind to the mechanical mind fit into the mix of things when related to the drug experimentation? Can experiences like this help to answer thought experiments like Nozick's pleasure machine or solve the moral dilemma of whether the robotic bliss of the characters in Huxley's Brave New World should be promoted or not? I think experiences like this can help to further unpack whether a medicated wonderland is plausible. If it was scientifically verified that a certain brain tweak (or a certain drug) could allow humans  non-diminishing, lifelong bliss with 2nd Order volitions present in their life that are all, in the end, fulfilled, then that brain tweak (or that drug)  should be our moral obligation to administer to everyone. I could not imagine a more fulfilling existence than the existence I just described.   

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Written between the hours of 11pm and 3am on the 14th and 15th of March, 2012, by Andrew Bloyce. It was since edited as minimally as possible to improve coherence and fix mistakes of phrasing and grammar. Essentially though, the content is exactly the same. The section about second-order desires and evolution is fairly weak and unsubstantiated - I left it in there nonetheless so that it would be a complete work of what I wrote on that night. What started out as an external monologue of cannabis-experience-expression turned into philosophy. The world is an interesting place.

Reference Notes:

Most of the influence for this essay came from Harry Frankfurt. Particularly this article:
H.G. Frankfurt. 1988. 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a person'

The rest of the influence came from the classical hedonistic philosophers – Epicurus, The Cyrenaics (Aristippus), Bentham, and more recently Tännsjö.