Utilitarianism, David Benatar, and Thought Experiments.

This blog post is a response to another philosophy blogger (blog here) who argues that utilitarianism becomes hard to swallow when considering a certain thought experiment. I discuss some interesting new philosophical literature that might, if accepted, provide reasons to doubt the strength of the thought experiment. I'm not sure (yet...) whether I accept the counter-argument I present but I think it is definitely food for thought (plus I've been wanting to blog about Benatar for a while now :P). The thought experiment is, as worded in the original post, as follows:

Imagine you are some sort of inter-dimensional space-time traveler, and you wind up in the following situation. You can create a better world than Earth in a new parallel universe (maybe you can do this by time-travel, or creating a mirror-universe somehow, or some other possibility). Now the new world is not an exact copy of our Earth. It is very similar, and has the same population, but it has different individual people in it. More importantly, there is some important and concrete way in which Earth Mark II is plainly superior – from a utilitarian perspective – to our Earth. Maybe in Earth Mk.II Hitler never existed, or racism, nationalism or religious intolerance never really took hold for some reason. As a result, there is more peace, trust, prosperity and diversity in the new world, and as a result more happiness. Or maybe there are just better supplies of safe drinking water in Africa, or terrific alternative energy-sources that don’t inject carbon into the atmosphere. Choose whatever you like that would make our world and its prospects better if we had it.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that to create that world you need to destroy our world (imagine that we need to demolish this planet in order to perform the mapping process that creates the almost mirror-image of Earth in the other universe).

Should you do it?

Breakey assumes that the utilitarian response would be to advocate the construction of the parallel universe in place of the current universe. He then states that destroying the existing world would also destroy the hopes and dreams of all the world's current people and that this move would not be justified by the creation of a 'super-happy' new world. Breakey discusses the problems that utilitarianism faces if potential people are given the same status as existing people; if this is the case peoples lives become mere vessels for carrying happiness and can be traded for the lives of people who could potentially be happier. This, for Breakey, is a serious concern.

As a utilitarian myself I am always keen to try and defend the theory against counter-arguments and I think this objection can be countered too. In short I would like to deny that the utilitarian is obligated to create "Earth Mark II" in place of the current earth. I think that the intuitively immoral consequences of this thought experiment can be escaped if one accepts certain arguments about the status of potential persons.  I believe it is the duty of the utilitarian to make 'people happy', rather than making 'happy people'. I will try to sketch out my reasons for this below:

The first assumption that must be accepted in order for the thought experiment to appear repugnant is that the destruction of the world will cause suffering to the inhabitants of the world. If the destruction of the world involves a slow and painful demise of all sentient creatures it is obvious how this might be the case. Both hedonistic utilitarians (like myself) and preference utilitarians can agree that this would be a bad thing because pain is intrinsically bad and unpleasant, and people generally have a preference to avoid pain.

But it might be the case that the destruction of Earth1.0 is not slow and painful but instead ephemeral and painless. If this is the case a preference utilitarian might want to argue that they would experience harm due to one's 'preference to continue living' being violated. Already I find this problematic because, as I have argued here, I do not understand how something impossible to perceive (like 'being dead') can be a harm at all. Hence I do not think that the world being destroyed is necessarily a bad thing provided that the destruction of Earth1.0 is unperceived (instantaneous, painless, unexpected, etc) - In this case there is no change in the utility of the agents involved and no recognition of an unfulfilled preference. This sort of argument, however, might be unconvincing to the type of preference utilitarian who holds that even unperceived-unfulfilled-preferences cause harm. Furthermore there is nothing in the thought experiment that suggests that the destruction of World1.0 would be either unperceived or painless.  

So, looking at the destruction of Earth1.0 as a stand-alone event it can be considered acceptable if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes no displeasure.

b) You are the type of preference utilitarian that believes that a preference must be perceived in order to cause pain and the destruction of Earth1.0 is not perceived (either before, during, or after the destruction).

On the other hand the destruction of Earth1.0 can be considered harmful if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes pain to sentient beings; or

b) You are a preference utilitarian with a preference to live which is denied through the destruction of Earth1.0    

But is the pain caused by the destruction of Earth1.0 (either through direct experience or through unsatisfied preferences) counteracted in a utilitarian calculus by the pleasure that will be experienced by the inhabitants of Earth2.0?  

To answer this I would like to share an argument put forth by David Benatar in his book "Better Never to Have Been". Benatar highlights that there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. His premises are:

1) The presence of pain is bad;

2) The presence of pleasure is good;

3) The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.

4) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

The most ambiguous and contested premise is probably the third one - It seems strange to think that the absence of pain can be good even if there is no-one around to experience it. Benatar explains that this premise must be thought of retrospectively in terms of the person that may have existed. For example think of a severely disabled person who suffers enormous amounts of untreatable pain and claims that she wishes that she was never born. This desire seems to make sense even though in the alternative world that she imagines she would not be there to appreciate her non-existence. This scenario supports premise 3 that 'The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone'. It seems uncontroversial to say that we might even have a 'duty' to prevent bringing people into existence that we know will suffer a great amount. The reason we wish not to bring these people into existence is because we feel that they are better off not-existing than experiencing the harms of existence.

So we agree (hopefully) that the absence of pain is good, even if the person that it is good for does not exist. The converse, however, does not follow. We do not seem to think that the absence of pleasure is bad unless there is somebody to experience this 'bad-ness'. To use another example we do not feel that we have a duty to bring happy people into existence. When we consider a couple that have the financial, emotional, and genetic means to have a happy child but choose not to procreate we do not consider them morally repugnant. The potential child experiences no harm in its non-existence despite the fact that it could have experienced great pleasure through existence. This argument supports premise 4 that 'the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation'.

There is a lot more to the argument that I have skimmed over for the purposes of brevity but I think the general direction that Benatar is headed is obvious. He illustrates his point using this matrix:

Benatar's argument is simple: Scenario B (non-existence) is preferable to Scenario A (existence). A 'good' + a 'not bad' is better than a 'bad' + a 'good'. If Benatar's argument is sound (and I'm still trying to establish whether or not it is myself) then the thought experiment proposed by Breakey must be seen in a different light. If one adopts Benatars outlook there would be no benefit in creating a whole new world full of people that otherwise would have not existed. The reason is that their non-existence is not a harm and that the pleasure that they are deprived off in non-existence is not experienced by anyone. Seen in this light the existence of Earth2.0 causes people that did not exist to exist, and, as seen in the matrix, this is arguably a bad move.

To return to the original thought experiment destroying Earth1.0 is only done because it is a necessary step in bringing Earth2.0 into existence and the existence of Earth2.0 is considered more beneficial than Earth1.0. But coming into existence is, according to Benatar, not a benefit at all - So there is no reason to consider destroying Earth1.0 in the first place! In fact Benatar would probably argue that the best state of being is in neither Earth1.0 or Earth 2.0 but non-existence. Nontheless there is no reason for mass-genocide because as Benatar points out there is an important distinction between lives worth continuing and lives worth starting. It might be that now, since we're alive, we might as well continue living. However were we to somehow objectively view our lives we would, argues Benatar, be no worse if we didn't exist then if we had the most pleasurable life imaginable.  

I admit that Benatar's argument is quite radical and I'm still working my way through his book to see whether I can agree with him, but so far I find his arguments hard to escape. The implications of his argument are far reaching and lead to an anti-natalist position. . . So part of me is hoping that there is a massive flaw in his argument somewhere so I can escape his conclusions.  

There is a great blog post on Benatar's writings here which deals with Benatar's central thesis in a lot more detail than I have in this post.

As always I welcome any comments or criticisms. 

Current Philosophy Interests + Harry Frankfurt book review.

Consider this blog post an unordered summary of philosophy-type things that I've been interested in lately.

I'm only doing 2 subjects at university this semester so I've got a lot of time of to read stuff that I've always wanted to read and explore bits of philosophy that hasn't been covered in lectures.

At the moment my interests are:

Harry Frankfurt:

I've always rather liked Frankfurt's clear but engaging writing style. When I write essays I always try to emulate the style of writers like Frankfurt and Peter Singer; they both explain themselves in a way that is neither too colloquial nor too esoteric. Their claims, despite often being controversial, always come across as being blindingly obvious; it's like these writers aren't actually telling you anything new, instead they are opening your minds to what you already know.

Anyway, I've revived my interest in Frankfurt and recently finished reading 'The reasons of Love'. I enjoyed it. Frankfurt starts of by making the valid observation that before one can start making decisions about what they do with their life they should first establish what it is that they value; what is is that they care about. An illuminating quote from the first chapter vividly paints the picture:


If we are to resolve out difficulties and hesitations in settling upon a way to live, what we need most is fundamentally is not reasons or proofs. It is clarity and confidence. Coping with our troubled and restless uncertainty about how to live does not require us to discover what way of living can be justified by definitive argument. Rather, it requires us simply to understand what it is that we ourselves really care about, and to be decisively and robustly confident in caring about it.

Frankfurt puts forth the claim that there are certain things that are almost universally cared about; these are things like one's own survival, and the well-being of one's children. Frankfurt argues that there is no need for a philosophical justification behind these motivating forces. These type of drives are innate and irrational. They are 'commands of love'. 


The definition of love is formulated that it ignores the qualities of the beloved (or at least makes them irrelevant). Objects of our love are valuable because we love them, not the other way around. Frankfurt makes it clear that we cannot choose what to love. It is here that Frankfurt's seminal ideas on freedom are re-introduced. Recognizing what it is that we love is the first difficult step towards fulfillment and freedom. It is common that we may have conflicting loves also. These are part of the difficulties we face when trying to understand ourselves.

Ultimately, Frankfurt claims that these difficulties are worth it because of the intrinsic importance in having something that we love (even if that something is ourselves). Having something to love provides us with a 'final end' for our actions and allows us to escape the curses of hedonic treadmills or adaptive preferences. Love is unique in that it can free us from uncertainness and hesitation. Frankfurt tells a story about Bertrand Russell who once alluded to the "restfulness of mathematical certainty". This restfulness; the sensation of finality, that feeling of illumination, that moment of clarity that occurs when you solve a maths problem or confidently make an important decision; these sensations are linked to an acceptance of a something that is believed to be 'so true' that the search for further meaning is put to rest. Love instills this same feeling in the lover. When one is in love certain decisions often become easier than before. Indecision is often left behind when one finds themselves in love with something - the fact that they love it is enough reason to pursue it. What we love acquires value for us because we love it. 


Frankfurt spends a lot of time (perhaps just a little too much time) in the middle of the book defending his views against imaginary criticisms. It gets a little bit repetitive.

Towards the end it becomes quite interesting and unique (although it's perhaps the shakiest section in terms of philosophical rigor) when Frankfurt discusses self-love. Frankfurt rejects the cultural taboo against loving oneself and instead re-frames it as a necessary component of a fulfilling life. 'Fulfilling' isn't actually word used in 'The reasons of love'. Frankfurt instead refers to a sort of 'inner harmony' that is experienced when one loves him/herself. 

Insofar as a person loves himself - in other words, to the extent that he is volitionally wholehearted - he does not resist any movements of his own will. He is not at odds with himself; he does not oppose, or seek to impede, the expression of practical reasoning and in conduct of whatever his self-love entails. He is free in loving what he loves, at least in the sense that his loving is not obstructed or interfered with by himself.

This whole passage just feels so distinctively Frankfur-ian to me. When I read Frankfurt his writing style is so honest and matter-of-fact that it feels as if he is writing based on extensive introspection rather than a steady session trying to balance out truth trees. This is probably the reason for which my interest in him isn't shared by many of my peers. I, however, consider the introspective style of writing to be highly engaging and aim for the same sort of style in my own work.  


Next up is his work 'Necessity, Volition, and Love'. I'll probably review it here too.

David Foster Wallace's 'Fate, Time, and Language'.

I've heard a LOT about David Foster Wallace but have never really been motivated to read any of his books. Infinite Jest just seemed overwhelming and most of his other works (from my limited research on him) seemed to be collections of short stories - something that I'm not really into. Nevertheless I found a book by Wallace released posthumously entitled 'Fate, Time, and Language' at the uni library and thought I'd have a look. Essentially it's Wallace's honors thesis (or maybe it's his PHD - I can't remember) that he wrote at university based on Richard Taylor's writings about Fatalism.

I'm not sure how I'll go with this one. Whilst I desperately want to say that I'll love every moment of the obscure metaphysics and modal logic the chances are that I'll probably find it a grind (if I even finish it). That being said so far it's been pretty engaging stuff and the actual thesis is only a small part of the book. The rest is notes about fatalism, it's critics, and it's supporters. So far, so good, if I finish it the review will be here.

The 'Abolitionist Project'.

I found this audio track whilst stumbling blindly through the interwebs:
http://www.abolitionist.com/abolitionist-project.mp3 I found it very thought provoking and interesting. As a bonus it's also somewhat related to Bio-ethics, which I'm currently studying. The abolitionist project is the aim to eliminate the suffering of all sentient creatures through the use of science: Essentially it's just taking utilitarianism to it's ultimate conclusion. Just reading up on it feels like I'm reading science fiction literature and it would be all too easy to dismiss it as grandiose ideas without real thought. This, however, would be far from the truth. It seems more likely that societal barriers will prevent the abolitionist project taking off rather than a lack of scientific innovation. We've already discovered drugs that can make mice 10 times more effective at processing energy (see 'Supermouse' below) and it is speculated that the same drug could be effective on humans.

 

 

It's certainly interesting stuff that's worth giving a serious thought. As the 'abolitionist project' website proudly quotes:

All truth passes through three stages. First it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.  - Arthur Shopenhauer.

What a great quote.

The intrinsic value of Life.

This has been of much interest to me since starting bioethics. Is human life intrinsically valuable? When I asked my classmates the answer has intuitively positive, but I'm not so convinced. It's not that I don't enjoy life - I do. It's just that I can't deny the fact that if I were to painlessly die in my sleep I wouldn't suffer from it. Those close to me would, but I wouldn't.

I've also always found it hard to accept calculations of aggregate happiness that lead to things like the Parfit's repugnant conclusion. Adding more people with 'live's worth living' to the world doesn't seem to me like it's doing any good. If anything it's just adding a drain on the earth's resources. It's a whole different matter once we're here - As soon as we exist we begin making commitments to the earth that make it hard to leave. We establish relationships, responsibilities, and the capacity to understand and feel both physical and emotional pain. BUT, if we were all to decide that we didn't want children and life on earth were to simply end I don't see it as a particular loss. I see it as a decidedly 'neutral' event.

I also see existence as fairly neutral. That's not to say that my average state of mind is neutral - it's not. But just that the 'value' of existence can't be calculated as a positive figure. it's just something that 'is'. Intuitively it seems like trying to ascribe a value to life is like trying to establish value to a fact about the world, like, say, the weight of a feather. Is the weight of a feather valuable? Is life valuable? Both seem like equally meaningless questions to me.

Anyway, this is an entirely new part of philosophy for me, so who knows where my position might be after reading up on the stuff. I'm going to start with David Benatar's controversial book entitled "Better never to have been: The harm of coming into existence". I'm very keen to read it.

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