Elitism in J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism

Elitism in J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism

"It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is only because they only know their side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." (Utilitarianism - J.S. Mill) 

It is this quote, parroted in ethics classes that slowly bugged me more and more while studying moral philosophy. Doesn't it just seem to reek of elitism? I thought it did and because of this slowly moved away from Mill's two-tiered conception of pleasures (lower and higher - bodily and intellectual, etc) to Bentham's more 'pure' conception of utility that is based on only intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty and propinquity/remoteness.

Recently, however, I read an article by D.D. Raphael[1] that led me to reconsider Mill's utilitarianism, or at least led me to drop my accusations of elitism on him. The passage in particular that appealed to me was this one:

"It is possible for Mill to maintain, as he does, that it is quite consistent with hedonism to say that the pleasure of philosophy is better in kind than the pleasure of rolling in mud - so long as he also maintains that the qualitatively higher pleasures are superior in quantity as well." (pg 11)

D.D Raphael's interpretation of Mill might look something like this:

 Whilst the fool is completely satisfied they are still not be as satisfied as Socrates. The scale on the above graph should represent absolute pleasure (10 representing bliss and 0 being nothingness). It's not that the fool isn't happy - the fool is indeed happy, as happy as he can possibly be! It's just that the fool is unaware that his potential for happiness could be increased if he were to take up poetry instead of pushpin. Socrates, on the other hand, is dissatisfied because there is a gap between his potential pleasure (the pleasures of philosophy perhaps) and his actual pleasure. So if we take an absolute perspective on happiness based on something fairly objective (maybe the level of endorphins and serotonin in someone's body) we can understand that it's completely possible to be dissatisfied yet still happier than someone who is completely satisfied. Being satisfied isn't everything - it matters the extent of the pleasure that is derived from the satisfaction too. 

I think that this is the most charitable interpretation of Mill because it avoids jumping to the conclusion that there is something metaphysically different between the higher and lower pleasures. Instead it is conluded that whilst both pleasures have the same quality (pleasure is pleasure no matter what its source) it is impossible that a lower pleasure can ever exceed a higher pleasure in terms of gross utility. So this type of thing would be inconceivable to Mill:

In this case although Socrates is engaging in higher pleasures he still has less overall pleasure than the fool. This does not compute for Mill. He says:

"It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower...From this verdict of only the competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal...What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general sufferage of those who are familiar with both?"

The underlying argument here is simply that somebody who has experienced both higher and lower pleasures would always choose the higher pleasure. The temptation is to flatly deny this argument and say something like "But right now I'd much rather have sex than be working on my metaphysics essay, philosophise that Mill!" and D.D Raphael does exactly that. Raphael responds:

"Could not the fool and the pig retort in kind? Socrates knows all about mental pleasures but not enough about bodily [pleasures]. The pig has no capacity to enjoy philosophy, but Socrates has spend so much time on philosophy that he has not given rolling in the mud a decent chance. He does not know the exquisite pleasure that it can bring to those who go in for it in a big way." 

 I wholeheartedly agree with Raphael. It is entirely conceivable that a lower pleasure could bring more utility than a higher pleasure and the attitude in which the pleasure is approached probably influences the utility derived also. I do not doubt that Mill gets more pleasure from philosophy than eating or sex. But maybe the reason that this is so is because he presupposed his conclusion beforehand and hence psychologically tricked himself into enjoying the food and sex less and the philosophy more. Perhaps cultural and societal influences were at play here - people who enjoy food are called gluttons, people who enjoy sex are deviants, etc, etc. 

Overall I still rather like Mill as a utilitarian but I'm looking forward to moving on and reading some Sidgwick for his more egalitarian account of pleasure as "desirable consciousness of any kind".

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[1] Raphael, D.D., Bentham and the Varieties of Utilitarianism, in: B. Parekh (Hrsg.), Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments, London 1993.

Utilitarianism, David Benatar, and Thought Experiments.

This blog post is a response to another philosophy blogger (blog here) who argues that utilitarianism becomes hard to swallow when considering a certain thought experiment. I discuss some interesting new philosophical literature that might, if accepted, provide reasons to doubt the strength of the thought experiment. I'm not sure (yet...) whether I accept the counter-argument I present but I think it is definitely food for thought (plus I've been wanting to blog about Benatar for a while now :P). The thought experiment is, as worded in the original post, as follows:

Imagine you are some sort of inter-dimensional space-time traveler, and you wind up in the following situation. You can create a better world than Earth in a new parallel universe (maybe you can do this by time-travel, or creating a mirror-universe somehow, or some other possibility). Now the new world is not an exact copy of our Earth. It is very similar, and has the same population, but it has different individual people in it. More importantly, there is some important and concrete way in which Earth Mark II is plainly superior – from a utilitarian perspective – to our Earth. Maybe in Earth Mk.II Hitler never existed, or racism, nationalism or religious intolerance never really took hold for some reason. As a result, there is more peace, trust, prosperity and diversity in the new world, and as a result more happiness. Or maybe there are just better supplies of safe drinking water in Africa, or terrific alternative energy-sources that don’t inject carbon into the atmosphere. Choose whatever you like that would make our world and its prospects better if we had it.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that to create that world you need to destroy our world (imagine that we need to demolish this planet in order to perform the mapping process that creates the almost mirror-image of Earth in the other universe).

Should you do it?

Breakey assumes that the utilitarian response would be to advocate the construction of the parallel universe in place of the current universe. He then states that destroying the existing world would also destroy the hopes and dreams of all the world's current people and that this move would not be justified by the creation of a 'super-happy' new world. Breakey discusses the problems that utilitarianism faces if potential people are given the same status as existing people; if this is the case peoples lives become mere vessels for carrying happiness and can be traded for the lives of people who could potentially be happier. This, for Breakey, is a serious concern.

As a utilitarian myself I am always keen to try and defend the theory against counter-arguments and I think this objection can be countered too. In short I would like to deny that the utilitarian is obligated to create "Earth Mark II" in place of the current earth. I think that the intuitively immoral consequences of this thought experiment can be escaped if one accepts certain arguments about the status of potential persons.  I believe it is the duty of the utilitarian to make 'people happy', rather than making 'happy people'. I will try to sketch out my reasons for this below:

The first assumption that must be accepted in order for the thought experiment to appear repugnant is that the destruction of the world will cause suffering to the inhabitants of the world. If the destruction of the world involves a slow and painful demise of all sentient creatures it is obvious how this might be the case. Both hedonistic utilitarians (like myself) and preference utilitarians can agree that this would be a bad thing because pain is intrinsically bad and unpleasant, and people generally have a preference to avoid pain.

But it might be the case that the destruction of Earth1.0 is not slow and painful but instead ephemeral and painless. If this is the case a preference utilitarian might want to argue that they would experience harm due to one's 'preference to continue living' being violated. Already I find this problematic because, as I have argued here, I do not understand how something impossible to perceive (like 'being dead') can be a harm at all. Hence I do not think that the world being destroyed is necessarily a bad thing provided that the destruction of Earth1.0 is unperceived (instantaneous, painless, unexpected, etc) - In this case there is no change in the utility of the agents involved and no recognition of an unfulfilled preference. This sort of argument, however, might be unconvincing to the type of preference utilitarian who holds that even unperceived-unfulfilled-preferences cause harm. Furthermore there is nothing in the thought experiment that suggests that the destruction of World1.0 would be either unperceived or painless.  

So, looking at the destruction of Earth1.0 as a stand-alone event it can be considered acceptable if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes no displeasure.

b) You are the type of preference utilitarian that believes that a preference must be perceived in order to cause pain and the destruction of Earth1.0 is not perceived (either before, during, or after the destruction).

On the other hand the destruction of Earth1.0 can be considered harmful if:

a) You are a hedonistic utilitarian and the destruction of Earth1.0 causes pain to sentient beings; or

b) You are a preference utilitarian with a preference to live which is denied through the destruction of Earth1.0    

But is the pain caused by the destruction of Earth1.0 (either through direct experience or through unsatisfied preferences) counteracted in a utilitarian calculus by the pleasure that will be experienced by the inhabitants of Earth2.0?  

To answer this I would like to share an argument put forth by David Benatar in his book "Better Never to Have Been". Benatar highlights that there is an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. His premises are:

1) The presence of pain is bad;

2) The presence of pleasure is good;

3) The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.

4) The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

The most ambiguous and contested premise is probably the third one - It seems strange to think that the absence of pain can be good even if there is no-one around to experience it. Benatar explains that this premise must be thought of retrospectively in terms of the person that may have existed. For example think of a severely disabled person who suffers enormous amounts of untreatable pain and claims that she wishes that she was never born. This desire seems to make sense even though in the alternative world that she imagines she would not be there to appreciate her non-existence. This scenario supports premise 3 that 'The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone'. It seems uncontroversial to say that we might even have a 'duty' to prevent bringing people into existence that we know will suffer a great amount. The reason we wish not to bring these people into existence is because we feel that they are better off not-existing than experiencing the harms of existence.

So we agree (hopefully) that the absence of pain is good, even if the person that it is good for does not exist. The converse, however, does not follow. We do not seem to think that the absence of pleasure is bad unless there is somebody to experience this 'bad-ness'. To use another example we do not feel that we have a duty to bring happy people into existence. When we consider a couple that have the financial, emotional, and genetic means to have a happy child but choose not to procreate we do not consider them morally repugnant. The potential child experiences no harm in its non-existence despite the fact that it could have experienced great pleasure through existence. This argument supports premise 4 that 'the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation'.

There is a lot more to the argument that I have skimmed over for the purposes of brevity but I think the general direction that Benatar is headed is obvious. He illustrates his point using this matrix:

Benatar's argument is simple: Scenario B (non-existence) is preferable to Scenario A (existence). A 'good' + a 'not bad' is better than a 'bad' + a 'good'. If Benatar's argument is sound (and I'm still trying to establish whether or not it is myself) then the thought experiment proposed by Breakey must be seen in a different light. If one adopts Benatars outlook there would be no benefit in creating a whole new world full of people that otherwise would have not existed. The reason is that their non-existence is not a harm and that the pleasure that they are deprived off in non-existence is not experienced by anyone. Seen in this light the existence of Earth2.0 causes people that did not exist to exist, and, as seen in the matrix, this is arguably a bad move.

To return to the original thought experiment destroying Earth1.0 is only done because it is a necessary step in bringing Earth2.0 into existence and the existence of Earth2.0 is considered more beneficial than Earth1.0. But coming into existence is, according to Benatar, not a benefit at all - So there is no reason to consider destroying Earth1.0 in the first place! In fact Benatar would probably argue that the best state of being is in neither Earth1.0 or Earth 2.0 but non-existence. Nontheless there is no reason for mass-genocide because as Benatar points out there is an important distinction between lives worth continuing and lives worth starting. It might be that now, since we're alive, we might as well continue living. However were we to somehow objectively view our lives we would, argues Benatar, be no worse if we didn't exist then if we had the most pleasurable life imaginable.  

I admit that Benatar's argument is quite radical and I'm still working my way through his book to see whether I can agree with him, but so far I find his arguments hard to escape. The implications of his argument are far reaching and lead to an anti-natalist position. . . So part of me is hoping that there is a massive flaw in his argument somewhere so I can escape his conclusions.  

There is a great blog post on Benatar's writings here which deals with Benatar's central thesis in a lot more detail than I have in this post.

As always I welcome any comments or criticisms. 

Some thougths about Utilitarianism and the Felicific Calculus.

CENTRAL TENET OF HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM: Morally right acts increase aggregate happiness. Happiness is measured as a subjective experience of pleasure.  

  

Assuming that we are trying to be perfect Utilitarians:

P1 - We should aim to perform perfect felicific calculus's. (see here)

P2 - Perfect felicific calculus's are conducted with a complete knowledge of all the 'relevant facts' involved.

P3 - We are ignorant about what the 'relevant facts' in a scenario will be until we encounter the scenario in which the felicific calculus is required.

C1 - Therefore ANY fact should be considered valuable because it is a potentially 'relevant fact'. (And the possession of 'relevant facts' is a necessary condition for conducting a reliable felicific calculus)

C2 - Therefore we should aim to gather as many facts about the world as possible.

P4 - We gather facts about the world through our direct and indirect experiences.

C3 - Therefore we should maximise our direct and indirect experiences.

We can reach C2 and C3 through the uncontroversial P1. I am concerned, however, with the implications of C3 and whether or not it is compatible with the central tenets of Utilitarianism.

I am defining 'direct experiences' as being something that we intimately experience and interpret into knowledge ourselves, i.e. learning about Japanese culture through going to Japan. Indirect experiences are equally important when the direct experience is not available; an example of an indirect experience might be reading a book about Japanese culture. In the second example the reader gains a direct experience of 'book-reading' and an indirect experience of Japanese culture. I cannot perceive of any other way that we might come to gain knowledge other than through direct and indirect experiences. I admit that just because someone has an experience it doesn't mean that it necessarily translates to knowledge. There are often examples of experience without knowledge (caused through a failure to observe or synthesize information). But there are never cases of knowledge without experience (excepting perhaps ingrained biological 'knowledge'). 

In order for experiences to be effectively turned into knowledge one must possess what I'd like to call 'philosophical virtues', or in other words one must be inclined to understand the world in a certain way. This idea falls broadly under the umbrella of Virtue Epistemology. Virtue Epistemology is a relatively new strand of philosophy that looks at the way that we understand the world and turn our observations into knowledge. Virtue Epistemologists follow in the Aristotelian tradition of looking at the quality of the reasons behind the judgement rather than the consequences of the judgement itself. It might seem bizarre to introduce something like virtues into a consequentialist theory however I believe it is entirely appropriate. Instead of defining virtues as things like courage, honesty, integrity, etc, I would like to define virtues as being 'tendencies to view the world such that sufficient data is obtained in order to conduct a felicific calculus'. Valued qualities in making a judgement might include things such as conscientiousness or open-mindedness. Another virtue might include the capacity to recognize unreliable evidence, e.g. testimony. It is these 'epistemological virtues' that mark the difference between those that can effectively conduct a felicific calculus and those that cannot. 

Provided that one possesses these aforementioned virtues there is no reason why every new experience couldn't provide the agent with a greater knowledge-bank to be used in future decision making. In fact, if one accepts the central tenet of hedonistic utilitarianism and the links between the premises above, one is obliged to have as many of these new experiences as possible. This is, I guess, the crux of my argument.

What happens, however, when one is faced with a choice between an option that will definitively increase pleasure and another option that will definitively increase knowledge?  The essence of utilitarianism is to increase total pleasure, however, as we have seen, this entails that knowledge be maximised too. How, given our ignorance of future states, should we decide on a course of action in such circumstances? 

For example imagine that you are at a Chinese restaurant and are offered either ice cream (your current favourite desert) or a traditional Chinese desert in which you know nothing about whatsoever. As far as you know the pleasure that you will receive from eating the traditional Chinese desert is a mystery - It might be horrible, or it might replace ice-cream as your favourite. In trying to be the best Utilitarian that you can be, what should you do?

I would argue that one should try the mystery Chinese desert even though there is a risk of discovering that it gives less pleasure than the ice-cream. The reason is that the world contains an admittedly large, but still finite, amount of experiences that can be had. This means that it is very likely than many experiences will be had more than once. If utilitarianism is adopted as a life-long system of morality acting in accordance with C3 (and hence maximising new experiences) this makes it more likely that felicific calculus's will be accurately conducted in the future.  Every new experience gives knowledge about a previously mysterious variable. This is how I propose that the alleged epistemological deficiencies of the utilitarian can be countered. One should only be deficient in knowledge of the pleasure potential of a particular course of action once per each unique action. This is because after acknowledging that they do not know whether the action beings about pleasure or not they will choose above all other options it in order to gain knowledge about it. 

There is one important exception that I make to this rule. This exception applies to choices between courses of action that have already been experienced and are known to be pleasurable and courses of action that have not been directly experienced but that one has reason to believe (through indirect knowledge) that the experience would be unpleasant. To return to the Chinese Restaurant example this would be a scenario in which your choice is still between the ice-cream and the traditional Chinese desert except that this time you are not in complete ignorance in regards to the Chinese dish. Your friend who is accompanying you says that he once had it and found it unpleasant. Here you are in a very difficult position. Whilst you know that things like 'taste' are quite subjective you also acknowledge that hitherto your food preferences have been very similar to this person. You do not like the idea of subjecting yourself to easily avoidable (and perhaps likely) displeasure, yet at the same time you recognise this moment as an opportunity to increase your knowledge about the world.

In these circumstances I would argue that it doesn't matter which option is chosen - the formula's can step aside here.There are merits to trying new things, however it is rash to deny pleasure for the sake of new experiences in all situations. There will be times in which one simply wants the pleasure of a comforting and familiar taste and doesn't like the potential risk for having an unpleasant experience. The decision to settle for such a thing is understandable and justifiable.

The decision making apparatus I would suggest in conjunction with the felicific calculus would look something like this:

Decision making matrix with 2 variables.	Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	Have not experienced in any way.
Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	1. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the pleasant option.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose either option. Both are valuable.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	2. Choose the pleasant option.	6. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	3. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	7. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	10. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	4. Choose either option. Both are valuable.	8. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	11. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	13. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have not experienced in any way.	5. Choose the unexperienced option.	9. Choose the unexperienced option.	12. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	14. Choose the unexperienced option.	15. Choose at random.

EXPLANATIONS:

 Squares 1, 6, 10, 13 and 15 are straight-forward decisions and can be made fairly easily provided tha tone possesses the epistemological virtues required to conduct an accurate felicific calculus.

Square 15 is similarly straight-forward - when choosing in absolute ignorance it really doesn't matter which path is chosen.

Decisions made in squares 2 and 11 show that, all other factors being equal, pleasure is chosen over displeasure.  

Decisions made in squares 3 and 7 show that paths that are indirectly known to be pleasurable should always be chosen. This is because it turns indirect knowledge into direct knowledge and because pleasure is, of course, a worthy goal.

The proposed decision to be made in square 8 shows that direct knowledge is taken to be more trustworthy than indirect knowledge. For this reason indirect displeasure is chosen for there is a chance that the knowledge received is faulty and, in fact, the path may prove to be pleasurable.

In square 5 I suggest that one should choose the unknown experience. This is because going from no knowledge whatsoever to direct knowledge represents a very valuable move.  

Square 9 is a rather intuitive decision - if you know that one of the options is certainly unpleasant you might as well try your luck with absolute chance.

In square 12 I advocate that that the indirectly experienced pleasurable experience be chosen over the unknown experience. This is because it I consider direct experiences to be the most valuable type. Although taking a risk on the unknown option may pay pleasurable dividends there is the risk that it may not. Conversely there is a good chance that the indirectly pleasurable experience may turn out to be directly pleasurable. And a move from indirect to direct knowledge is valuable in itself.

Square 14 is again rather intuitive. Whatever option is chosen there will be the benefit of gaining direct knowledge. It makes sense to take a risk on the mystery choice rather than accepting what will probably be an unpleasant experience.

Square 4 is the most interesting square on the matrix. It is what might be called the 'freedom square'. When one is faced with this type of decision I do not think that there is any more merit in either option than the other. It is certainly a noble move to choose the indirectly unpleasant experience in order to fully understand whether it is unpleasant it actually is (and how unpleasant it is), however when faced with the competing choice of definitive pleasure it is entirely acceptable to forgo such a choice.

I imagine that a person who chooses to live this way for an entire lifetime would have an immense range of pleasant and unpleasant experiences; she would be vastly knowledgeable and quite different to the typical portrayal of the shallow, pleasure seeking utilitarian stuck on an endless hedonic treadmill. I believe that the move I have just made from P1 to C3 is a necessary, albeit not revolutionary, move that needs to made to increase the legitimacy of utilitarianism. Ascertaining how widespread pleasure is best achieved is a vast empirical challenge and requires a great deal of inter-disciplinary knowledge from biology to psychology to cultural studies and beyond. Whatever criticisms that you may have towards utilitarianism any claim that it is overly simple is simply false.  

I believe that something along the lines of the argument I have just presented must be adopted if one is seriously considering adopting utilitarianism as a long term morality. I have begun opening myself up to a range of new experiences recently as part or my moral and personal development. It's incredible how often something that something you have avoided because of mere heresy turns out to be quite pleasurable. Recent examples include going vegetarian - I suspected it would be awful and difficult when really it just forced me to make more creative (and still delicious) meals. Another beneficial example of actively pursuing new experiences has been forcing myself to read things that I'd heard negative reviews about. I read 'The Moral Landscape' by Sam Harris recently and actually quite enjoyed it despite all the negative reviews I'd read. Sure, it wasn't perfect but it wasn't horrible any where near as horrible as some of the reviews I'd read. The same goes for Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. . . sort of. . . well actually as it turned out the hearsay I heard was partly true - I got a little overwhelmed and bored by the sheer size of the thing; BUT, nevertheless I can now actively participate in conversations about Rand and Harris without merely regurgitating common-places. Maximising experiences not only helps you be a better utilitarian it also helps fight the spread of dogmatic belief!

Nepal - Day #15 - Pokhara

I devoted most of my Sunday to finding travel gifts for my friends and family. I bought my sisters some woven pencilcases, some friends some prayer flags, my dad a Yak-wool blanket, and my best mate a traditional Nepalese board game. ('Bagh Chal')

I didn't do much us else during the day but that was fine with me. I lounged around in the hotel, read more rousseau and finished reading "eating animals". (I'd recommend it -  I might write a review of it sometime)

Guy went paragliding and described it as 'sheer terror' for the first 5 minutes followed by 30 minutes of 'beautiful, amazing adrenaline'.



(^An amusing nepali attempt at english)

In the evening we went back to the busy bee cafe (although really it's a bar) and I managed to engage Guy in a philosophical discussion. Although I'm really just passionate about philosophy and enjoy discussing it with people my intense questioning (some would say 'interrogation' - I disagree) is often interpreted as me trying to change the persons beliefs. This is so incorrect. Sometimes I wish people would change their beliefs of their own free choice - if I'm the person that triggers them to re-think their beliefs then 'so be it'. But I would hate to think that somebody would change their beliefs because I told them to.

Guy was quick to realize this, which made our discussions much easier.

I get a perverse satisfaction by putting forth the most controversial thought experiment I can plausibly accept and watching my companion squirm as I seem to defy all common sense. ('The philosophy of one generation is the common-sense of the next') My particular brand of hedonistic act utilitarianism (or 'extereme utilitarianism' to use J.J.C. Smart's term) is rarely accepted with ease.