Some thougths about Utilitarianism and the Felicific Calculus.

CENTRAL TENET OF HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM: Morally right acts increase aggregate happiness. Happiness is measured as a subjective experience of pleasure.  

  

Assuming that we are trying to be perfect Utilitarians:

P1 - We should aim to perform perfect felicific calculus's. (see here)

P2 - Perfect felicific calculus's are conducted with a complete knowledge of all the 'relevant facts' involved.

P3 - We are ignorant about what the 'relevant facts' in a scenario will be until we encounter the scenario in which the felicific calculus is required.

C1 - Therefore ANY fact should be considered valuable because it is a potentially 'relevant fact'. (And the possession of 'relevant facts' is a necessary condition for conducting a reliable felicific calculus)

C2 - Therefore we should aim to gather as many facts about the world as possible.

P4 - We gather facts about the world through our direct and indirect experiences.

C3 - Therefore we should maximise our direct and indirect experiences.

We can reach C2 and C3 through the uncontroversial P1. I am concerned, however, with the implications of C3 and whether or not it is compatible with the central tenets of Utilitarianism.

I am defining 'direct experiences' as being something that we intimately experience and interpret into knowledge ourselves, i.e. learning about Japanese culture through going to Japan. Indirect experiences are equally important when the direct experience is not available; an example of an indirect experience might be reading a book about Japanese culture. In the second example the reader gains a direct experience of 'book-reading' and an indirect experience of Japanese culture. I cannot perceive of any other way that we might come to gain knowledge other than through direct and indirect experiences. I admit that just because someone has an experience it doesn't mean that it necessarily translates to knowledge. There are often examples of experience without knowledge (caused through a failure to observe or synthesize information). But there are never cases of knowledge without experience (excepting perhaps ingrained biological 'knowledge'). 

In order for experiences to be effectively turned into knowledge one must possess what I'd like to call 'philosophical virtues', or in other words one must be inclined to understand the world in a certain way. This idea falls broadly under the umbrella of Virtue Epistemology. Virtue Epistemology is a relatively new strand of philosophy that looks at the way that we understand the world and turn our observations into knowledge. Virtue Epistemologists follow in the Aristotelian tradition of looking at the quality of the reasons behind the judgement rather than the consequences of the judgement itself. It might seem bizarre to introduce something like virtues into a consequentialist theory however I believe it is entirely appropriate. Instead of defining virtues as things like courage, honesty, integrity, etc, I would like to define virtues as being 'tendencies to view the world such that sufficient data is obtained in order to conduct a felicific calculus'. Valued qualities in making a judgement might include things such as conscientiousness or open-mindedness. Another virtue might include the capacity to recognize unreliable evidence, e.g. testimony. It is these 'epistemological virtues' that mark the difference between those that can effectively conduct a felicific calculus and those that cannot. 

Provided that one possesses these aforementioned virtues there is no reason why every new experience couldn't provide the agent with a greater knowledge-bank to be used in future decision making. In fact, if one accepts the central tenet of hedonistic utilitarianism and the links between the premises above, one is obliged to have as many of these new experiences as possible. This is, I guess, the crux of my argument.

What happens, however, when one is faced with a choice between an option that will definitively increase pleasure and another option that will definitively increase knowledge?  The essence of utilitarianism is to increase total pleasure, however, as we have seen, this entails that knowledge be maximised too. How, given our ignorance of future states, should we decide on a course of action in such circumstances? 

For example imagine that you are at a Chinese restaurant and are offered either ice cream (your current favourite desert) or a traditional Chinese desert in which you know nothing about whatsoever. As far as you know the pleasure that you will receive from eating the traditional Chinese desert is a mystery - It might be horrible, or it might replace ice-cream as your favourite. In trying to be the best Utilitarian that you can be, what should you do?

I would argue that one should try the mystery Chinese desert even though there is a risk of discovering that it gives less pleasure than the ice-cream. The reason is that the world contains an admittedly large, but still finite, amount of experiences that can be had. This means that it is very likely than many experiences will be had more than once. If utilitarianism is adopted as a life-long system of morality acting in accordance with C3 (and hence maximising new experiences) this makes it more likely that felicific calculus's will be accurately conducted in the future.  Every new experience gives knowledge about a previously mysterious variable. This is how I propose that the alleged epistemological deficiencies of the utilitarian can be countered. One should only be deficient in knowledge of the pleasure potential of a particular course of action once per each unique action. This is because after acknowledging that they do not know whether the action beings about pleasure or not they will choose above all other options it in order to gain knowledge about it. 

There is one important exception that I make to this rule. This exception applies to choices between courses of action that have already been experienced and are known to be pleasurable and courses of action that have not been directly experienced but that one has reason to believe (through indirect knowledge) that the experience would be unpleasant. To return to the Chinese Restaurant example this would be a scenario in which your choice is still between the ice-cream and the traditional Chinese desert except that this time you are not in complete ignorance in regards to the Chinese dish. Your friend who is accompanying you says that he once had it and found it unpleasant. Here you are in a very difficult position. Whilst you know that things like 'taste' are quite subjective you also acknowledge that hitherto your food preferences have been very similar to this person. You do not like the idea of subjecting yourself to easily avoidable (and perhaps likely) displeasure, yet at the same time you recognise this moment as an opportunity to increase your knowledge about the world.

In these circumstances I would argue that it doesn't matter which option is chosen - the formula's can step aside here.There are merits to trying new things, however it is rash to deny pleasure for the sake of new experiences in all situations. There will be times in which one simply wants the pleasure of a comforting and familiar taste and doesn't like the potential risk for having an unpleasant experience. The decision to settle for such a thing is understandable and justifiable.

The decision making apparatus I would suggest in conjunction with the felicific calculus would look something like this:

Decision making matrix with 2 variables.	Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	Have not experienced in any way.
Have directly experienced and is pleasant.	1. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the pleasant option.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose either option. Both are valuable.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have directly experienced and is unpleasant.	2. Choose the pleasant option.	6. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be pleasant.	3. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	7. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	10. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.
Have indirectly experienced and is thought to be unpleasant.	4. Choose either option. Both are valuable.	8. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be unpleasant.	11. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	13. Apply Felicific calculus.	Choose the unexperienced option.
Have not experienced in any way.	5. Choose the unexperienced option.	9. Choose the unexperienced option.	12. Choose the option that you know indirectly to be pleasant.	14. Choose the unexperienced option.	15. Choose at random.

EXPLANATIONS:

 Squares 1, 6, 10, 13 and 15 are straight-forward decisions and can be made fairly easily provided tha tone possesses the epistemological virtues required to conduct an accurate felicific calculus.

Square 15 is similarly straight-forward - when choosing in absolute ignorance it really doesn't matter which path is chosen.

Decisions made in squares 2 and 11 show that, all other factors being equal, pleasure is chosen over displeasure.  

Decisions made in squares 3 and 7 show that paths that are indirectly known to be pleasurable should always be chosen. This is because it turns indirect knowledge into direct knowledge and because pleasure is, of course, a worthy goal.

The proposed decision to be made in square 8 shows that direct knowledge is taken to be more trustworthy than indirect knowledge. For this reason indirect displeasure is chosen for there is a chance that the knowledge received is faulty and, in fact, the path may prove to be pleasurable.

In square 5 I suggest that one should choose the unknown experience. This is because going from no knowledge whatsoever to direct knowledge represents a very valuable move.  

Square 9 is a rather intuitive decision - if you know that one of the options is certainly unpleasant you might as well try your luck with absolute chance.

In square 12 I advocate that that the indirectly experienced pleasurable experience be chosen over the unknown experience. This is because it I consider direct experiences to be the most valuable type. Although taking a risk on the unknown option may pay pleasurable dividends there is the risk that it may not. Conversely there is a good chance that the indirectly pleasurable experience may turn out to be directly pleasurable. And a move from indirect to direct knowledge is valuable in itself.

Square 14 is again rather intuitive. Whatever option is chosen there will be the benefit of gaining direct knowledge. It makes sense to take a risk on the mystery choice rather than accepting what will probably be an unpleasant experience.

Square 4 is the most interesting square on the matrix. It is what might be called the 'freedom square'. When one is faced with this type of decision I do not think that there is any more merit in either option than the other. It is certainly a noble move to choose the indirectly unpleasant experience in order to fully understand whether it is unpleasant it actually is (and how unpleasant it is), however when faced with the competing choice of definitive pleasure it is entirely acceptable to forgo such a choice.

I imagine that a person who chooses to live this way for an entire lifetime would have an immense range of pleasant and unpleasant experiences; she would be vastly knowledgeable and quite different to the typical portrayal of the shallow, pleasure seeking utilitarian stuck on an endless hedonic treadmill. I believe that the move I have just made from P1 to C3 is a necessary, albeit not revolutionary, move that needs to made to increase the legitimacy of utilitarianism. Ascertaining how widespread pleasure is best achieved is a vast empirical challenge and requires a great deal of inter-disciplinary knowledge from biology to psychology to cultural studies and beyond. Whatever criticisms that you may have towards utilitarianism any claim that it is overly simple is simply false.  

I believe that something along the lines of the argument I have just presented must be adopted if one is seriously considering adopting utilitarianism as a long term morality. I have begun opening myself up to a range of new experiences recently as part or my moral and personal development. It's incredible how often something that something you have avoided because of mere heresy turns out to be quite pleasurable. Recent examples include going vegetarian - I suspected it would be awful and difficult when really it just forced me to make more creative (and still delicious) meals. Another beneficial example of actively pursuing new experiences has been forcing myself to read things that I'd heard negative reviews about. I read 'The Moral Landscape' by Sam Harris recently and actually quite enjoyed it despite all the negative reviews I'd read. Sure, it wasn't perfect but it wasn't horrible any where near as horrible as some of the reviews I'd read. The same goes for Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. . . sort of. . . well actually as it turned out the hearsay I heard was partly true - I got a little overwhelmed and bored by the sheer size of the thing; BUT, nevertheless I can now actively participate in conversations about Rand and Harris without merely regurgitating common-places. Maximising experiences not only helps you be a better utilitarian it also helps fight the spread of dogmatic belief!

#13 - Christmas, Pets and Avatar.

Our society is experiencing mass-scale cognitive dissonance. I think it might be a combination of adoration for my grandparents dogs, re-watching Avatar and reading an extensive amount of Peter Singer that lead me to this - perhaps melodramatic - conclusion. I visited my grandparents for christmas and told them that I had recently become a vegetarian. As usual I was met with the usual mixture of bewilderment and disbelief - like the idea is so foreign that it is unthinkable. I repeated my usual explanatory spiel (it's not about the sanctity of animal life, just about suffering, uncertainty of origins of supermarket meat, etc) and tried to move on, to downplay the whole situation. This was difficult, however, amidst christmas ham and turkey where avoiding meat is akin to refusing to open presents. Nevertheless my grandparents catered for my dietary choices and for that I am grateful.

Throughout the day my grandparents commented on how much they love their dog and how special their dog is to them, you know, the usual stuff. They expressed a love for the dog that (on mere observation) seemed similar to the love a parent expresses towards a child. Furthermore I have no doubts that if their dog were to fall ill they would willingly incur significant financial loss to ensure the dogs wellbeing.

Later on the day we watched James Cameron's Avatar. Apart from being just a generally enjoyable film it is interesting in the way that it subtly (perhaps inadvertently) challenges social norms. Specifically I am referring to the way in which the viewer is positioned to overcome speciesism and feel empathy towards the Na'ri race rather than the human race. This is in stark contrast with reality in which Anthropocentrism is predominant (or at least widespread). The dramatic power of the movie relies upon viewers feeling a sense of disgust towards the humans' flagrant dismissal of the well-being of the Na'ri race. The Na'ri race have an entirely different set of priorities and DNA (if the acronym 'DNA' even applies here) to the human race yet they share our capacity for emotional and physical suffering. . . Perhaps you see the parallels I am drawing here? . . . If only the Na'ri race were more anatomically different to human beings than they are portrayed (rather than essentially just being blue copies of ourselves with tails) and were unable to speak the movie could well have been a parable-like animal rights documentary. The movie appeals to a sense of empathy in the viewer that surpasses arbitrary concerns of race and species. The almost obligatory quote to use here is Bentham when he states: ' The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can they suffer?' and it seems as if this sentiment is instinctly shared by many people (as evidenced by their reactions to Avatar) whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not. People express these same feelings when they save their pets from burning buildings or when they decide to become vegetarian. It is a feeling that comes naturally and frequently but it's effects are usually rather limited.

It seems odd that the potential exploitation and suffering of the fictional Na'ri race arouses such a passionate response from viewers yet our real equivilant of this - the factory farming of animals for human consumption - is met with a disproportionate lack of concern.

As mentioned earlier I tend to feel sheepish and overwhelmed at the incredulity people express towards my vegetarian eating choices. I am now beginning to mirror this reaction towards meat-eaters. All matters of morality aside the vegetarian can appeal to a strong sense of consistency when pampering a pet or showing emotional responses to movies like Avatar. The meat eater is in a more difficult position and must choose to defend one of several equally counter-intuitive positions to retain credibility. The meat-eater must either;

A) Admit that they would subject their pets to factory farming conditions; OR
B) Claim that there is a relevant difference between their pets (and the Na'ri race) and factory farmed animals that allows for their differing treatment.

If neither of these concessions can be made the meat-eaters position is untenable, inconsistent, and a prime example of cognitive dissonance.

As vegetarians (in my admittedly short experience) are often thought of as being self righteous I think that the criticism of inconsistency directed at meat-eaters is far more fair than claiming that they lack empathy or compassion. Clearly meat-eaters are as equally compassionate as vegetarians, it is simply that many meant-eaters (whether they are aware of it or not) are holding conflicting sentiments, or 'cognitive dissonance' if you like. Many people are unaware of this dissonance and I see it as nothing less than a respectful service to the individual in question to have this hidden affliction pointed out. Likewise I would welcome criticisms that would help me refine my position on the matter. If these people are aware of, and accept that there are, inconsistencies in their position yet they refuse to change their ways they could be claimed to be suffering from what Kant called 'akrasia' or simply 'weakness of the will'. In my experiences, however, this is rarely the case and most people are simply apathetic. Regardless that is a rant for another time.