#13 - Christmas, Pets and Avatar.

Our society is experiencing mass-scale cognitive dissonance. I think it might be a combination of adoration for my grandparents dogs, re-watching Avatar and reading an extensive amount of Peter Singer that lead me to this - perhaps melodramatic - conclusion. I visited my grandparents for christmas and told them that I had recently become a vegetarian. As usual I was met with the usual mixture of bewilderment and disbelief - like the idea is so foreign that it is unthinkable. I repeated my usual explanatory spiel (it's not about the sanctity of animal life, just about suffering, uncertainty of origins of supermarket meat, etc) and tried to move on, to downplay the whole situation. This was difficult, however, amidst christmas ham and turkey where avoiding meat is akin to refusing to open presents. Nevertheless my grandparents catered for my dietary choices and for that I am grateful.

Throughout the day my grandparents commented on how much they love their dog and how special their dog is to them, you know, the usual stuff. They expressed a love for the dog that (on mere observation) seemed similar to the love a parent expresses towards a child. Furthermore I have no doubts that if their dog were to fall ill they would willingly incur significant financial loss to ensure the dogs wellbeing.

Later on the day we watched James Cameron's Avatar. Apart from being just a generally enjoyable film it is interesting in the way that it subtly (perhaps inadvertently) challenges social norms. Specifically I am referring to the way in which the viewer is positioned to overcome speciesism and feel empathy towards the Na'ri race rather than the human race. This is in stark contrast with reality in which Anthropocentrism is predominant (or at least widespread). The dramatic power of the movie relies upon viewers feeling a sense of disgust towards the humans' flagrant dismissal of the well-being of the Na'ri race. The Na'ri race have an entirely different set of priorities and DNA (if the acronym 'DNA' even applies here) to the human race yet they share our capacity for emotional and physical suffering. . . Perhaps you see the parallels I am drawing here? . . . If only the Na'ri race were more anatomically different to human beings than they are portrayed (rather than essentially just being blue copies of ourselves with tails) and were unable to speak the movie could well have been a parable-like animal rights documentary. The movie appeals to a sense of empathy in the viewer that surpasses arbitrary concerns of race and species. The almost obligatory quote to use here is Bentham when he states: ' The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can they suffer?' and it seems as if this sentiment is instinctly shared by many people (as evidenced by their reactions to Avatar) whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not. People express these same feelings when they save their pets from burning buildings or when they decide to become vegetarian. It is a feeling that comes naturally and frequently but it's effects are usually rather limited.

It seems odd that the potential exploitation and suffering of the fictional Na'ri race arouses such a passionate response from viewers yet our real equivilant of this - the factory farming of animals for human consumption - is met with a disproportionate lack of concern.

As mentioned earlier I tend to feel sheepish and overwhelmed at the incredulity people express towards my vegetarian eating choices. I am now beginning to mirror this reaction towards meat-eaters. All matters of morality aside the vegetarian can appeal to a strong sense of consistency when pampering a pet or showing emotional responses to movies like Avatar. The meat eater is in a more difficult position and must choose to defend one of several equally counter-intuitive positions to retain credibility. The meat-eater must either;

A) Admit that they would subject their pets to factory farming conditions; OR
B) Claim that there is a relevant difference between their pets (and the Na'ri race) and factory farmed animals that allows for their differing treatment.

If neither of these concessions can be made the meat-eaters position is untenable, inconsistent, and a prime example of cognitive dissonance.

As vegetarians (in my admittedly short experience) are often thought of as being self righteous I think that the criticism of inconsistency directed at meat-eaters is far more fair than claiming that they lack empathy or compassion. Clearly meat-eaters are as equally compassionate as vegetarians, it is simply that many meant-eaters (whether they are aware of it or not) are holding conflicting sentiments, or 'cognitive dissonance' if you like. Many people are unaware of this dissonance and I see it as nothing less than a respectful service to the individual in question to have this hidden affliction pointed out. Likewise I would welcome criticisms that would help me refine my position on the matter. If these people are aware of, and accept that there are, inconsistencies in their position yet they refuse to change their ways they could be claimed to be suffering from what Kant called 'akrasia' or simply 'weakness of the will'. In my experiences, however, this is rarely the case and most people are simply apathetic. Regardless that is a rant for another time.

#12 - More Parmenides

Ok, so I said my next post would be about Zeno's Paradoxes. . . It's not. It's more Parmenides. Actually it's the assignment I recently submitted on Parmenides. I didn't really get to explain myself too much because it's only a mid-semester essay and there was a wordcound of 1500 I had to abide by. Also the topic choices were all fairly dull. Hopefully I'll have something more exciting for the final essay, which will probably be on Aristotle's ethics.

Parmenides and Being

Parmenides is one of the original 'armchair philosophers', a rationalist who believed that through sheer power of thought one could overcome the toughest of philosophical problems. Parmenides is most notable for his enquiries into the nature of what is (or perhaps more importantly what is not) in his work 'On Nature'. It is arguably through this work that we gain two very important logical principals; the law of excluded middle and the law of non-contradiction. We do, however, also gain some less commonly accepted conclusions - The revelation that nothing changes, nothing moves, and everything is made up of one unified block of being. These claims certainly require some explanation and I will attempt to do so presently by investigating Parmenides' premises, Parmenides' conclusions, and the general coherency of his overall argument. I will attempt to translate Parmenides' arguments into logical notation and will finally put the formula to the test through the use of a thought experiment.

Parmenides begins his poetic prose by conjuring to mind the scenario in which he approaches a goddess in a chariot. The goddess informs Parmenides that there are two main ways of enquiry, enquires about what is (also called the 'path or persuasion') and enquiries about what is not. Of these two routes it is only the first that is truthful and valuable says the goddess. The justification for this is simple; to attempt to think or speak of something that is not is impossible because to even bring it to mind necessarily implies it's existence. To think or speak one must think or speak about something. As soon as one finds themselves thinking about that something it must necessarily exist. Thus Parmenides puts forth that the very notion of something 'not being' is contradictory.

Before moving on to the conclusions Parmenides draws from this argument it would be of use to clarify some key details of his argument. Firstly, when Parmenides refers to what is and what is not it must be understood that Parmenides is writing in a language that does not require an accompanying subject to give meaning to these seemingly fragmental phrases. Given this fact it is acceptable interpret the phrase it is as applying to anything at all and the phrase is not as referring to nothing.

Secondly, it may be noted that Parmenides equates the thoughts of things with the existence of the actual thing - or more precisely he doesn't recognise any differentiation between the physical and mental realms at all. This position is explicitly stated in section 3n when Parmenides claims:

                The same thing is there for thinking of and for being. (Parmenides. 3n)

 This worldview was not uncommon for the time and is known as monism. Monism refers to the view that the world is comprised of a single type of stuff, be this physical stuff, mental stuff, or otherwise. Philosophers who support the notion that everything is comprised of physical stuff are often called materialists (or advocates of physicalism), those who support the view that everything is made up of mental projections (for lack of space for a better description) are called idealists, and those who support the view that the world is made up of something else that is neither mental or physical are sometimes referred to as 'neutral monists'. (Palmer) Although the term came much later I would be tempted to call Parmenides a neutral monist as he believed that everything was made up of 'being'. I will further discuss the implications of my interpretation of Parmenides as a neutral monist later.

Returning now to Parmenides argument; Parmenides concluded that because it is nonsensical to speak of something not being things that exist must be eternal and unchanging. The reasoning behind this is that if something were to begin to exist (or cease existing) it would have to move from being nothing into being something (or vica versa). This transition would require meaningful discussion about something coming from nothing, a process that Parmenides finds problematic. Parmenides asserts that nothing comes from nothing ('ex nihilo nihil fit') and hence concludes that existing things must always have existed. Another consequence of taking Parmenides theories about what is and is not to their logical conclusions is a denial of time as we currently understand it. Time arguably involves change so without change there must be no time. This can be understood by imagining a world in which two consecutive world states are identical in every way. Would you be tempted to say that time had stopped for those moments? - I suspect that Parmenides would. The fact that we understand the events of the past, present, and future in different ways and perceive time as passing is simply an indication of the limitations of our human condition and does nothing towards proving that the passing of time is a real phenomenon. The only way to approach these sorts of problems is through rigorous logical reasoning (and not empirical observation) says Parmenides, and coins this type of enquiry as 'The path of persuasion'.

I will now attempt to formalise Parmenides argument and test it against a thought experiment that will expose it's difficulties.

First of all let's look at Parmenides’ premises as they appear most clearly. These seem to be:

P1)         Whatever can be spoken or thought of necessarily is. (Parmenides, Section 6n)

and

P2)         The Other: that it is not and it necessarily must not be. That, I point out to you, is a path              wholly unthinkable, for neither could you know what-is-not (for that is impossible), nor could             you point it out. (Parmenides, Section 2n, #2)

When interpreted as follows:

x = it is. (and it's negation accordingly 'it is not')

y = it can be thought and/or spoken about.

Parmenides premises become:

P1)  y ⊃ x

P2) ~y ⊃  ~x

These two premises actually lead to the conclusion that (y ≡ x). The transition from y ⊃ x and  ~y ⊃  ~x  to (y ≡ x) is shown to be valid in Appendix A.  

Given the interpretations outlined above consider the following thought experiment:

It is the year 2100. Unbeknownst to the citizens of earth there is a substance in the centre of the earth that is completely unlike any other substance every examined. It is neither solid, nor liquid, nor gas, nor is it similar or comparable to anything ever observed. Understandably no sentient being ever mentions this substance because it would be impossible to do so with the current knowledge that the citizens of earth have about what can and does exist. However in the year 2200 this mystery substance is discovered and labelled 'Mysterium'. From 2200 onwards people regularly think and talk about Mysterium.

Let us refer to 'mysterium' as it.

In 2100 it is not thought and or spoken about. Therefore, according to P2, it is not.

In 2200 it is thought and spoken about. Therefore, according to P1, it is.

However this seems to contradict Parmenides conclusions that things do not come into being. What was not in 2100 ('mysterium') is in 2200. This conflicts with Parmenides account of being when he explicitly states :

                Thus it must completely be or be not. (Allen, Fragment 8)

 So either my thought experiment is misrepresentative or there is a flaw in Parmenides' argument. I will now try and explain why, given the same premises, Parmenides and I reach different conclusions.

The problem is somewhat similar to the one that George Berkeley faced when he realized that things could essentially pop in and out of existence depending on whether a sentient being perceived it. Berkeley solved this problem by appealing to the omnipresent nature of God who prevents things from constantly coming in and out of existence by always perceiving them. Parmenides could potentially make a similar argument and say that the 'mysterium' had indeed existed the whole time and God had perceived it. There is, however, not sufficient evidence to suggest that Parmenides had this type of solution in mind and the application of Occam's Razor would dictate that such a clause be omitted.

The question therefore remains: What is the status of objects that escape our epistemological grasp?

When a dualist position is adopted the solution is easy: Simply explain that the 'mysterium' had probably always existed but we just hadn't perceived it. For the monist the problem is far more difficult. Due to word-length constraints I cannot elaborate very much upon this point however if my arguments are flawed it would probably be due to mis-representing Parmenides as a strict monist. I do believe, however, that this claim is not without evidence and therefore holdfast that the above thought experiment poses a problem with Parmenides' theory.

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Reference List

Allen, R.E. 1966. 'The Eleatics'. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle. New York: The Free Press. pp. 44-49.

Palmer, John, "Parmenides", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/parmenides/>.

Parmenides, On Nature, (http://home.ican.net/~arandall/Parmenides/Parm.html)

Russell, Bertrand. The History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945.

Stubenberg, Leopold, "Neutral Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/neutral-monism/>.

APPENDIX A

X	Y	y ⊃ x	~y ⊃  ~x	y ≡x
0	0	0 1 0	10 1 10	010
0	1	1 0 0	01 1 10	100
1	0	0 1 1	10 0 01	001
1	1	1 1 1	01 1 01	111

(y ⊃ x),  ( ~y ⊃  ~x)  ⊨ (y ≡ x)

The argument form above is valid because in every case in which the premises are both true the conclusion is also true.

#10 - Parmenides

I'm doing a Summer Semester at Uni on Greek Philosophy. So far I'm finding it quite enjoyable. Today we looked at Parmenides and I experienced the same blissful confusion that I experienced when I first read Descartes. It's a strange feeling, when the conclusion seems bizarre and you're sure that there is a problem with the premises somewhere but it's just so hard to find. Here's what I mean:

(NOTE: A lot of what I'm writing here is paraphrased lecture notes. So some credit should go to William Grey for teaching this stuff to me)

Parmenides makes the following claim:

1) Anything inquired into either exists or doesn't exist.
2) We can know nothing of what does not exist because it is impossible to think about what does not exist.
3) Only things that exist can be thought of.
4) Anything that can be thought about and can exist must exist, for it can exist and nothing (i.e. what does not
exist) cannot exist.
5) Therefore, in reference to premise one only the first alternative is possible: if something can
be thought about it actually exists.

The first thing that must be cleared up is that Parmenides is a monist - he believed that the world is made up on only one type of matter. Modern philosophy tends to like to split things up a bit more and determine between a physical and a mental world and such. Not so for Parmenides.

The temptation when faced with the above argument is to attack premise 3 and say "I'm thinking about a unicorn crossed with an echidna and THAT doesn't exist.". This argument only really works when one defines real as meaning something like 'exists in the empirically observable world'. For Parmenides the things that you think about or imagine are just as 'real' as the things that you see and smell so the animal you described is certainly real. We tend to have enormous confidence in calling our everyday experiences 'real' and describing people who experience hallucinations as having an experience that is less real. In some ways we really are being terribly overconfident in making this claim, Nick Bostrom argues that it is, in fact, more likely than not that we are living in a simulated computer experiment. In any case it's not unimaginable that in the future all of our now private mental events may become empircally observable hense breaking down the real/unreal barrier.

ANYWAYS, MOVING ON...

Parmenides come to a few unsettling conclusions...


A) Suppose that something came into existence.
B) Then there was a time when it did not exist.
C) So we are committed to talking about what (at some time) does not exist.
D) But we cannot talk about what does not exist.
E) So it makes no sense to talk of something beginning to exist.

The same argument works to say that it makes no sense to say that things ever cease to exist.

All pretty interesting stuff I thought. I've got a few criticisms and ideas about Parmenides theories but I'll let them ferment in my mind a bit before I try and express them here. I think next week we'll be looking at Zeno's paradoxes so I might make a post about that too. Fun fun. :)

#9 - Books

I haven't posted for a while. I've been busy with work, skyrim, and a massive pile of books that I've been trying to get through. Any suggestions as to which one I read first?

#8 - Patriotism

NOTE: After writing all this I realized that it isn't necessarily patriotism that I have a problem with (I don't mind if somebody has visited virtually all the countries in the world and decides after all that they like their country of birth the best) but unjustified patriotism - Patriotism for it's own sake. 

Patriotism, given its most charitable definition, is a devotion for one's country. It is also generally heralded as a desirable and positive value. I do not believe that patriotism is either valuable intrinsically or valuable consequentially. I will argue these points by firstly refining what 'patriotism' is generally meant to mean, discussing the origins of patriotism as a value, looking at the demands of patriotism and finally summarizing some of the more negative consequences that an unrestrained and unquestioning patriotism can yield.   

Let us first take a look at what the word 'patriotism' actually means. It certainly seems  prima facie as if patriotism implies a certain exclusivity. It is not common that you hear of someone being patriotic to more than one country. Furthermore patriotism is usually linked to the country of one's own birth. Given these additional common features of patriotism I do not think there is a large leap in redefining Patriotism as being: A devotion to one's country of birth at the exclusion of an equal devotion to any other countries. 

This sort of patriotism is generally expected of most citizens even if not explicitly alluded to. People generally sing praises of their countries and make claims like "I wouldn't want to live anywhere else" even when they haven't experienced any other country than their own. If criticised for their outlandish claim (how could you possibly say that you wouldn't want to live anywhere else when you have only experienced one locality?) this same person would probably look at you like you had made a serious faux pas. Patriotism is not only a desirable value but is also a socially engrained, accepted and expected trait - It is a cultural norm that is reflected through our "Buy Australian Made" signs and sporting competitiveness. Like most norms however Patriotism remains largely unquestioned.

So why should we feel patriotic? This is the part that I struggle with. It all seems almost farcical how arbitrary the grounds for patriotism are. It seems to be a case of luck what country we are born and raised in. Before our birth we had no choice or input into which country we would soon be expected to be patriotic towards. I can easily imagine circumstances in which I was born in England or Japan and would have adopted the same sense of patriotism for that country. This does not of course, instantly degrade the value of patriotism - It just means that it isn't intrinsically valuable. But perhaps it holds some instrumental value, maybe patriotism brings about more good in the world than it does bad.

Patriotism gives us a heightened sense of community. In a world of steadfastly patriotic types everybody could be friends with one another under the common flag provided that certain obligations be fulfilled. Because, you see, in practise patriotism goes far further than simply claiming 'oh yes, I love my country'. It means committing oneself to a myriad of other values that are have been historically prevalent.

It is common rhetoric in Australia that perceived negative courses of action are labelled 'un-Australian' by one political party or another. This claim is mysteriously insulting to many people who have fallen prey to the transparent binary opposition of Australian = Good, Un-Australian = Bad. But to call something un-Australian or un-American or un-*any country* isn't to say anything very revolutionary. It simply says "the residents of this country haven't often thought of things in that way". The values of a country are determined not through the search for an intrinsic thing of value, nor through the development of a categorical imperative nor through any sort of rational deliberation - They are developed through looking backwards, through looking into the past.   

Were there such a thing as Australian Values (or any country specific values) these values would be discovered by looking into the past to see what the previous generations had deemed to be important and emulating these values in the future. A disposition to blindly accept these values lies at the heart of patriotism. To be an Australian patriot you simply must care about giving people 'a fair go' or supporting 'the aussie battler' without questioning the origins of these beliefs or their practical value. If you disagree with these values you're simply un-Australian. 

One of the side-effects of unrestrained patriotism is an enlarged collective ego. This is to be expected through the self-congratulatory rhetoric that patriots world-wide engage in but it also creates the illusion that we have reached the apex of our development. This provides a disincentive to change and fosters ethnocentrism (the feeling that one's own cultural rules are superior or more right than the rules of other cultures).  

Whilst largely a topic to be discussed in a later blog I am primarily bothered by the patriotism of wealthy western countries because of the sense of entitlement that goes with it. In Australia (and I'm sure in many other countries) the phrase 'we must protect our way of life' is thrown around a lot. Again, to even mutter that phrase you must assume that any deviation from the status quo would be a downgrade. To say 'we must protect our way of life' is to adopt a discourse of war; what exactly is being 'protected' and from what or whom are we protecting it? More importantly 'why protect it at all?'; if we really have reached the apex of enlightenment (we haven't) why would we neglect to share this with the world? It is because we feel somehow entitled to our privileged and 1st world surroundings, a feeling of entitlement that is misplaced. Patriotism provides a socially acceptable alternative to fulfilling our obligations to human beings in suffering overseas with the excuse that 'we should support those at home first'.

There is much that Australia could learn from other countries and vica versa - Patriotism is the arrogant value that prevents this shared quest for enlightenment from occurring. Socrates is quoted to have said "I am a citizen, not of Athens or Greece, but of the  world". I couldn't agree any more passionately. We are all citizens of the world.  

#7 Moral Relativism.

All credit to Saturday Morning Breakfast for this one.


http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2415#comic

#6 Amartya Sen. Beer. Brownies.

My Sunday night has comprised of reading Amartya Sen's book 'The Idea of Justice', drinking a superb beer called 'Aphrodisiaque', and eating chocolate brownies. It could be the incredible potency of the beer (it packs a considerable 6.5% ABV) but I'm feeling pretty good about life in general at the moment. I got a call earlier this week to inform me that I'd got the job at QPAC, tomorrow night we're hosting a party, and swotvac has just begun. Anyways, I'll tell you a little about 'The Idea of Justice' based on what I've read so far (I'll be sure to write a better review when I've finished reading it).

I hadn't read much of Amartya Sen before I bought 'The Idea of Justice' so I had no idea whether or not it would be my sort of style at all. As it turns out I find Sen incredibly easy to read and very engaging. His prose reminds me of reading Peter Singer (although obviously the content is quite different), it isn't unnecessarily academic or esoteric (as a lot of philosophy can tend to be) yet at the same time it doesn't undermine the intelligence of the reader. As the title suggests the theme seems to be concerned with 'justice'. Most of the philosophy that I read is concerned with morality or ethics and seems to focus on 'right-ness' or 'wrong-ness' of the decisions that we make. 'The Idea of Justice' takes a broader look at morality and focuses on the institutions and social systems that we live in. 'The idea of Justice' has the same sorts of aims as Rawl's 'A theory of Justice' and Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' and could probable be labelled as a sort of political philosophy.

I'm only 87 pages in so far so I can't really tell you much about Sen's theories yet, but I can tell you that Sen's work is worth reading if only for his prose and background. So far I've learnt about Ashoka Maurya and the ancient approaches to justice of Niti and Nyaya. It feels good to hear about the history and philosophy from non-western countries and it is, I think, hugely beneficial from a philosophical perspective to do so in order to avoid cultivating a 'west is best' prejudice. Anyhow, so far Sen hasn't actually began explaining his own theories and has just explained how and why his theory will differ from the Rawls' 'Theory of Justice' and the problems with trancendental institutionalism.  

***************

#5 - Marriage Privatisation & Nietzsche

The way I see it there are 2 ways to achieve marriage equality in Australia:

1) Give same-sex couples the same marriage rights as straight couples;

OR

2) Take away the marriage rights of straight couples. 

It seems that option 1 gets far more coverage in the media, which is a fact I find interesting. What exactly is so important about marriage that abolishing the institution altogether is frowned upon so much? Perhaps it is my place in culture that makes it easy for me to question these things - I am told that marriage was taken much more serious 50 years ago. Now, however, people get divorced as much as they get married and the 'sanctity' of marriage isn't really apparent. The reason that I think people are hanging on to the marriage idea is simply because it is culturally ingrained into them. Here is a passage from Nietzsche that I think reflects this ideology perfectly:

Custom and what is in accordance with it.— To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a law or tradition established from of old. Whether one submits to it gladly or with difficulty makes no difference; enough that one submits. We call “good" the man who does the moral thing as if by nature, after a long history of inheritance—that is, easily, and gladly, whatever it is (he will, for example, practice revenge when that is considered moral, as in the older Greek culture). He is called good because he is good “for" something. But because, as mores changed, goodwill, pity, and the like were always felt to be “good for" something, useful, it is primarily the man of goodwill, the helpful man, who is called “good." To be evil is to be “not moral" (immoral), to practice bad habits, go against tradition, however reasonable or stupid it may be. To harm one’s fellow, however, has been felt primarily as injurious in all moral codes of different times, so that when we hear the word “bad" now, we think particularly of voluntary injury to one’s fellow. When men determine between moral and immoral, good and evil, the basic opposition is not “egoism" and “selflessness," but rather adherence to a tradition or law, and release from it. The origin of the tradition makes no difference, at least concerning good and evil, or an immanent categorical imperative; but is rather above all for the purpose of maintaining a community, a people. Every superstitious custom, originating in a coincidence that is interpreted falsely, forces a tradition that it is moral to follow. To release oneself from it is dangerous, even more injurious for the community than for the individual (because the divinity punishes the whole community for sacrilege and violation of its rights, and the individual only as a part of that community). Now, each tradition grows more venerable the farther its origin lies in the past, the more it is forgotten; the respect paid to the tradition accumulates from generation to generation; finally the origin becomes sacred and awakens awe; and thus the morality of piety is in any case much older than that morality which requires selfless acts. (Human, All too Human 96)

This is one of my favorite passages of Nietzcshe that I have read so far and reflects the mob morality that I come across every day. Most people simply accept that there are things that are right and wrong without questioning the arbitrary tradition that has led them to this belief. It is these people that will repeatedly assert "But marriage is between a man and woman!" with the belief that they have genuinely asserted a statement of worth. I don't believe that these generations deserve abuse for what are now seen as outdated values; to quote Nietzsche once more:

Socrates and Plato are right: Whatever man does he always does the good, that is to say: that which seems to him good (useful) according to the relative degree of his intellect, the measure of his rationality. (Human, All too Human 102)   

Outside of philosophical circles it is quite rational to base ideals for the future on the successful ideals of the past. For this reason I don't think that it is fair to say that those who have a knee-jerk reaction against same-sex marriage are immoral or stupid or anything else like that. It is, however, blameworthy to keep a closed mind or refuse to acknowledge relevant details of a situation.

I'll keep this post brief because my desires to run off on a tangent are becoming unbearable. The point I am trying to make is that there is another often overlooked solution to the same-sex marriage problem that maintains equality. Contrary to popular criticism I do not believe that privatizing marriage would de-value it in any way, rather it would strengthen the bonds of marriage because of the personal ties that people could make. Perhaps marriage could still be a 'legal bond' in that the vows written by the wed-couple must be abided by or else an agreed consequence would occur but this really isn't the important part. The important part is the 'expressive aspect' of marriage discussed by Martha Nussbaum in 'From Disgust to Humanity'. Marriage expresses a a public declaration of love that not only proudly defines the persons involved but deserves recognition by the public. I do not believe that privatizing marriage would degrade this 'expressive aspect' of marriage at all.

#4 - Earthlings. And why I am a Vegetarian.

So I just finished watching 'Earthlings'. It's a documentary about Speciesism and particularly the treatment of non-human animals by humans. I am already a vegetarian so I didn't experience quite as much self-hate as the first time I watched a documentary of this kind, but it was still good to re-enforce my ethical position. Part of the reason I started this blog was so that I didn't drive my housemates psychotic by engaging them in non-consensual philosophical discussion. It didn't work. Immediately after watching 'earthlings' moey and I started talking again about why I am a vegetarian. (or rather I spoke at moey about why I am a vegetarian). People ask me this question a lot, so i'll do my best in explaining my position the best I can whilst trying to avoid seeming too self righteous (which is, I think, a common perception of vegetarians).

NOTE: I would like to first alert the reader that I am purposely adopting a position of epistemological skepticism for this bit of writing. This is because I do not want to seem biased in any way. Because of this I've made some assumptions that probably allow a little too much skepticism into my argument. I figure if I can get an successful argument going whilst remaining skeptical at all times I will have done ok.


When I talk with some meat-eaters they are supremely charitable in their descriptions of factory farms. I hear things like 'But if we didn't farm them they'd be left out in the elements and that is worse than factory farming' and 'They are given all the food they need without needing to search for it, how great is that' and 'All the bad factory farms are overseas, it's not like that in Australia'. Conversely I'll admit that documentaries like 'earthlings' probably intentionally highlight the worst parts of the farming.

There is a fairly steadfast empirical solution to all of this - Simply start visiting slaughterhouses and farms and don't stop until you've visited them all. After investigating all of them you'd hopefully have a pretty informed and trustworthy hypothesis on the ethical status of factory farming as a whole. Unfortunately however, I do not have the means nor the time to conduct such an investigation so I will have to attempt to give a charitable generalization. This generalization would have to place the wellbeing of animals within factory farms as being somewhere in between zero suffering (as some meat-eaters would like to believe) and severe suffering (as the vegetarian documentaries portray). So let's generalize and say that there exists both types of factory farms; those in which animals do not suffer at all and those in which animals suffer greatly. There is also a middle ground (which I would assume represents the bulk of factory farms) in which a moderate amount of suffering is felt.

NOTE: You may have noticed that I chose to use the terms Zero, Moderate, and Severe suffering rather than something like Blissful Existence, Neutral Existence, and Agonizing Existence. I have adopted to avoid prescribing the possibility of animals having a Blissful Existence in a factory farm and instead accepted the lesser claim that they might experience Zero Suffering. (which by some definitions, i.e. negative hedonism, is equal to pleasure anyway).


I'll assume that you accept this generalization and I'll move on. I'd like to also take on the optimistic assumption that as human beings we do not want to cause undue suffering. Given the generalization that there are 3 types of factory farms out there (Suffering Free Farms, Moderate Suffering Farms, and Severe Suffering Farms) It would be causing undue suffering to choose anything other than the 'Suffering Free Farm'. I think this is fairly self explanatory: To choose anything other than the Suffering Free Farm meat would be to incur suffering that could be easily avoided (namely by purchasing the Suffering Free Meat).

The problem is that the average consumer simply isn't given enough information about whether or not the meat they come across at woolies or coles has come from a 'Suffering Free Farm'. Nor does the average consumer  have the drive to investigate the source of their meat themselves either. So more often than not the consumer simply picks up whatever is on the shelf. If this is the case then each time the consumer picks up a cut of meat they are taking a gamble on whether or not the meat was humanely raised. If one has accepted my above generalization then a meat buyer is taking a gamble between buying meat that has come from a Suffering Free Farm, a Moderate Suffering Farm, or a Severe Suffering Farm. In keeping with my intentional perspective of epistemological skepticism, and having avoided the task of exhaustive empirical investigation, I have to assume that I have no knowledge whatsoever of the percentages of meat produced by the three aforementioned farms and therefore must make my decision under conditions of extreme ignorance and uncertainty.

I would argue that a logical approach to making a decision under complete ignorance would be to simply assume that each possibility has equal odds of occurring. Under this account there are 2 unacceptable results (Moderate and Severe Suffering) adding up to a percentage chance of 66.66% chance that you have chosen one of these cuts of meat and a remaining 33.33% chance that you have chosen meat that has come from a Suffering Free Farm. It seems that the chances of getting meat from a Suffering Free Farm is less than the chances you will get inhumanely raised meat.

NOTE: If I had decided to go with the alternative scheme of Blissful Existence, Neutral Existence, and Agonizing Existence my argument would probably have become quite interesting as the value of a Neutral Existence would come into question. Ultimately though it doesn't really matter either way because as I am about to explain having just one unacceptable option in the realm of possibilities amounts to the chance to cause undue suffering, which is something that we have agreed we want to avoid.

We are now stuck with the dilemma that we want to avoid inflicting undue suffering but have no control over knowing whether or not we will do so. I reached this dilemma myself and came up with a few solutions:

1) Just don't eat meat.
2) Investigate the source of all meat that I buy to ensure it is ethically raised and slaughtered.
3) Raise my own animals for slaughter so I can personally ensure that they enjoy a healthy, happy, natural life with a painless departure.

All of these options seemed pretty difficult to me but I ended up going with option one. I decided that if skipping meat was a tremendously awful experience I would move on to option two and then again, if awful, on to option three. As it happened however going without meat was pretty easy and I don't really even miss it now. I still do occasionally eat meat, for example if my housemate has purchased too much meat for dinner and is about to throw it out I may eat some if I'm hungry - I don't see the harm in consuming meat that would otherwise be waste material. I just don't gamble on my chances of supporting an inhumane industry when I'm at the supermarket.

#3. QPAC.

I had a pretty swell day today. 

I had a group interview for a job at QPAC. Contrary to my expectations it was actually a pretty fun experience. There were about 20 of us and we all started out together in a large foyer area just waiting around. The tension was beautiful. For some reason it gave me a great pleasure to look around and watch everyone watching everyone else. It's an interesting scenario - the group interview. So anyway we all stood around looking at each other pretending to be friendly whilst (at least subconsciously) sizing up our opposition. It was great.

Once we got started it was revealed that we would participate in a few group activities. These were the type of thing that you can probably remember doing in primary school, i.e. building a tower out of newspaper (no really, we did that). It was, quite honestly, the most enjoyable job interview I've ever had. Sure, everyone knows that you've got your potential employers watching over you to see whether you decide to hog the sticky tape but nobody really minded. I was fun. To make it better there I also developed a bit of an infatuation with one of the other applicants (not that she'd know it given the 5-6 words I spoke to her all day). I really hope that we both get the job so that I can actually have a chance to talk to her. So job prospects are looking up.

Now I'm at home, eating some potato and parsnip soup I made and drinking one of my top 5 favorite beers - Don De Dieu. It is pretty incredible. I'm feeling pretty chuffed. 

#2 - The Catcher in the rye.

I just finished reading 'The Catcher in the Rye' by J.D Salinger. You've probably read it, but if you haven't it's an introspective, stream-of-consciousness style book about the main character Holden's perspective on the world. It's an angsty piece of writing with a sort of observational dark wit. Holden isn't exactly a likable character (not for me anyway), but he's understandable; he's relate-able. The tone of the whole book is almost too personal; it feels like someone has gone into your brain and extracted all your most cynical thoughts and put them on paper. Holden's outlook on life reminds me of the sort of thinking that I have at the end of one of those days were everything has turned to shit and there is nothing left to do to make yourself feel better but to pretend that the problem lies in everyone else.

I finished the book and was both glad I read it and glad it was over. Because the plot line was so subtle (much more a story of mental development more than actual events) the appeal of the book rests upon whether or not you like (or can relate to) the main character Holden. For me, Holden represents that part of me that I have but wish I didn't; I imagine this is how lots of people feel after reading The Catcher in the Rye. Holden is the part of you that feels isolated because you can never truly understand how anyone else feels and neither can they truly understand you. He's the part of you that observes people exchanging culturally ingrained but repulsively fake pleasantries and wants to smite the world for the being so fickle.

Nevertheless it's not all existentialism and social criticism; amongst the angst there is plenty of observational humour, some nice emotional character development between Holden and his sister Phoebe and countless exposés of the 'phony-ness' of society. It's also interesting to read because of the language differences - the word 'damn' is used often and (i think) meant to be pretty offensive. That being said it's a super easy read and still feels pretty relevant to today. Oh yeah, thanks Lottie for suggesting this one to me. :)

#1

I have a blog now. I'll be using this blog mostly to rant about things that people generally don't want to hear about. So on that note, WELCOME.

My first batch of beer finished brewing today and on the whole it was a failure. Well, not exactly a failure, but not really a party-in-your-mouth sort of sensation. Still, for my first time brewing beer from scratch (grains, water, hops, yeast, sugar, none of this 'kit' stuff) I'm fairly satisfied with the stuff. The good thing about my beer is that it only takes one week to brew because I make it on such a micro scale (only 5 liters at a time) and have developed a method to merge the traditional primary and secondary stages of fermentation into a single stage. So I think with a little tweaking I could get a pretty inexpensive small scale brewing operation going. . . (if my motivation lasts).

So far the problems are as follows:

1) Carbonation is pretty weak.
2) Beer has bits of grain in it and is cloudy.
3) Alcohol Content is a little lower that I would like (It is currently at 3.5% ABV, about the same as a XXXX Gold)

Fortunately I know how I'm going to fix these problems for the next batch and I'll let you know how it all goes.